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INTRODUCTION
Paternity suits make good headlines,' but they often make bad law.
The headlines are news, no doubt, because people care as much about the
tangential question-who was sleeping with whom-as they do about
the ultimate question-i.e., who is the father? This article will suggest
that whatever the allure of examining peoples' sex lives, the law should
abandon its interest in determining biological paternity. The legal rights
and duties of fatherhood should emanate from commitment and contract,
not from sex or genes.
Currently, fatherhood is a status that brings with it rights and obliga-
tions. For the most part, these rights and obligations attach regardless of
whether one meets or exercises them. They attach, at least according to
paternity doctrine, by virtue of one's blood connection to the child. This
article challenges that law of parental status at two levels. First, it dem-
onstrates that often, notwithstanding paternity doctrine, blood has little to
so with one's status as father. What matters instead is one's relationship
with the mother. More specifically, contract or private bargaining be-
tween individuals often tells us more about who the law will consider a
father than does blood. Second, this article suggests that thinking about
fatherhood as a fixed status is problematic. One's status as father (or
mother) should depend on whether one exercises the rights and fulfills
the obligations of parenthood, not on whether one has a blood
connection.
This second level challenge-to the idea of fixed fatherhood-is a
logical outgrowth of the first challenge to paternity law, because it is the
logical outgrowth of thinking about parenthood as contract. If one fails
to meet the obligations of a contract to parent, one can lose the rights that
the contract provides. By the same token, if one promises to perform the
I See, e.g., Ice-T Hit with Paternity Suit, SAN ANTorno EXPRESS-NEWS, June 9, 2002, at
2J; Jefferson Fathered Slave's Children, Foundation Says, CHI. TRiB., Jan. 27, 2000, at 4N;
Pat Moore, 'I Just Want to Know the Truth'; Man Seeks Proof That He's Son of Conway
Twitty, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 8, 1996, at 3E; Puzzle: Why Do Jacko's Kids Have
White Skin?, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 15, 2003, at ID.
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obligations of parenthood or performs them in a context in which a
promise to do so can be inferred, then one can be bound in contract, not
because of one's status, but because of one's deliberate acceptance of
fatherhood.
The argument begins in Section I with a brief historical and contem-
porary explication of the paternity suit. Section I then demonstrates just
how little the law actually cares about biological paternity by examining
those cases in which the law rejects biology as a basis for paternity. The
last part of Section I analyzes potential rationales for holding a biological
father accountable as a father on the basis of biology alone. None of the
rationales that might justify holding biological fathers automatically re-
sponsible for the support of their biological children can be reconciled
with the case law, constitutional doctrine, or contemporary mores.
Section II of the article suggests a different theory of paternity-one
that can reconcile much of the case law, constitutional doctrine, and con-
temporary mores. It reveals that courts often root paternal obligation in
contract with the mother, not biology. This section shows how contract
theory is remarkably consistent with the traditional framework, which let
marriage define paternity, parallel to the contractual framework gov-
erning most parenthood decisions in the reproductive technology area,
operative in many of the equitable cases vesting obligation in non-bio-
logically related persons, and better reflective of the way that fatherhood
is experienced by both parents and children.
Thus, Section I shows just how little paternity law is actually rooted
in genetics. Section II shows just how much it is rooted in contract.
Section III moves from the descriptive to the normative to explore in
more detail the theoretical nature of that contract. First, it examines how
contracting for parental rights fits the reliance and will theories of con-
tract, consideration theory of contract, and relational theories of contract.
Section III then scrutinizes the entitlements and obligations that are actu-
ally exchanged in these contracts. It suggests and defends two ideas that
are likely to be controversial. First, a gestational mother holds all initial
rights and obligations to a child.2 With some built-in limitations, the
mother has parental rights and obligations to contract away as she
chooses. Second, the obligation to support a child can be limited tempo-
rally, so that the paternal obligation reflects what was bargained for in
the agreement between mother and father, not a static notion of father-
2 This idea is not new. Martha Fineman endorsed a mother-focused family that elimi-
nated all notions of fatherhood almost ten years ago. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 1-9,
228-33 (1995). This article endorses a family structure in which mothers hold initial rights and
obligations but fathers almost always share those rights and obligations. See infra Section M.
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hood. Section III concludes with examples of how the contract regime
would work in practice.
Section IV explores the relative costs and benefits of embracing this
contract model. Among the benefits is the elimination of the current dis-
tinction between how parental status is determined for parents of children
born by virtue of reproductive technology and how parental status is de-
termined for parents of children born by virtue of sexual intercourse.
The contract model also eliminates the distinction between how parental
status is assigned to straight and gay parents. The partner of a gestational
mother (or one who contracts with that mother) acquires parental rights
and obligations by virtue of an agreement with the mother, not by virtue
of genetics. More important, the proposal offered here recasts father-
hood as a truly volitional status-a set of rights and obligations that one
willingly agrees to. It does so, in part, by severing the legal link between
sexual activity and reproduction, as medicine now routinely does, and as
is necessary in order to bring the law of parental status up to date with
contemporary mores and the contemporary law of sexual activity. The
proposal also makes clear that if one does not fulfill the obligations of
fatherhood, one can lose the status of father, and if one enjoys the rights
of fatherhood, one can become a father.
Among the possible costs of the proposed system is increased direct
state expenditure for children. The state could no longer demand that the
male participant in a heterosexual encounter be automatically responsible
for any biological issue of that encounter. It is not clear that the pro-
posed system would be more expensive than the current one because
most men who are now liable as genetic fathers would be liable as con-
tractual fathers.3 Nonetheless, without doubt, the system proposed here
works best with greater government expenditure on children. Mothers
will be less vulnerable if the state takes more responsibility for support-
ing children. Today, the United States is the only industrialized country,
save China, to not provide subsidies to the caretakers of children.4 Nu-
merous eminent scholars routinely call for such subsidies. 5 If we em-
3 See infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
4 See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, RESEARCH REPORT #65, SOCIAL SECURITY
PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD-1997, SSA Publication No. 13-11805, xxv-xxvi, xxx-
xxxv. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 (2000) provides for "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families"
(TANF) but those subsidies, as the name indicates, are temporary and need-based. Most of the
rest of the world provides for caretakers, regardless of their class, for the full term of a child's
minority. See id.
5 See FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 231-32 (suggesting we "face, value, and therefore sub-
sidize caretaking and caretakers"); Robin West, The Right to Care, in THE SUBJECT OF CARE
88, 88 (Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002) (supporting a right to "doulia," defined
as "a right to some measure of state, social, or community support for caregiving labor");
Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE
L.J. 967, 992-94 (1999) (endorsing cash payments for single mothers in poverty).
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braced the caretaking norm that most of the rest of the world embraces,
the parental status model endorsed here would run little risk of making
mothers too vulnerable.
Alternatively, as is the case in many other countries, biological fa-
thers could be held accountable for their reproductive activity without
necessarily becoming legal fathers. Numerous other countries make bio-
logical fathers reimburse the state for part of the support of their biologi-
cal issue, but what they pay is often only a fraction of the support that the
mother receives from the state. 6 This kind of partial responsibility could
deter irresponsible sexual behavior without making fathers out of people
who never intended to be or acted as parents. 7
I offer these ideas in the introduction so as to assuage concerns
about the ramifications of adopting the proposed contract model. The
semi-biological system we have now survives, in large part, because of
fear of what happens to children if we relieve biological fathers of auto-
matic parental responsibility. Thus, we let an incoherent, outdated, and
remarkably inconsistent paternity system govern mostly because we are
too scared of what happens if we abandon it. As a result, we often let
men who have enjoyed the benefits of fatherhood escape parental obliga-
tion, we preference blood over nurturing in a way that denies rights to
functioning parents, and we force men who never intended to be or acted
as fathers to be fathers. Both children and adults deserve a system in
which parental status is determined in a fair, understandable, and coher-
ent manner. Contract provides that system, and this article shows how. 8
Before starting, a note on gender is in order. This article uses the
terms mother and father in their biological and social senses, not in the
sense to which they refer to the sex of a person who is parenting. I do
this both for convenience (the parental roles have traditionally been so
gendered that it is much easier to refer to the gendered label than to
describe the work being done) and to underscore what can be important
differences in the jobs that parents perform. Yet women can father and
men can mother. What is important is not the sex of the people perform-
ing the roles, but how adults allocate the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood. This is an article about how and why the law should con-
6 See Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B. Kamerman, Introductory Note: Child Support in Eu-
rope and Israel, in CHILD SUPPORT 45, 49 (Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B. Kamerman eds. 1988).
7 For more on the benefits of this idea, see infra notes 340-43 and accompanying text.
8 Moving towards a parental rights regime rooted in contract is a first step that this
article endorses. Deciding which particular contract doctrines will be most appropriate in what
situations requires more analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 234-42. For instance, the
extent to which legislatures should impose boilerplate terms, the applicability of third party
beneficiary analysis, and the use of unconscionability analysis are all questions that are left for
another day. The thesis here is limited to presenting contract as the appropriate construct to
conceptualize the origins and obligations of parental status.
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strue parental rights as a function of the private bargaining between the
adults who negotiate the rights and obligations of parenthood.
I. THE INCOHERENCE OF PATERNITY LAW
A. THE ORIGINS OF LEGAL PATERNITY
A biological father's duty to support his non-marital children
originated in England in 1576, as part of the British Poor Laws. Parlia-
ment passed a law allowing justices of the peace to seek reimbursement
from fathers whose biological children were receiving public assistance.9
Thus the paternal support duty originated as an attempt to help alleviate
the state's burden for poor, illegitimate children. Children and unwed
mothers of children who were not receiving public assistance had no
right to support from a biological father. It was not until 1844 that Brit-
ish unwed mothers, regardless of their welfare status, acquired the right
to sue biological fathers for support.' 0
In this country, the rationale for and implementation of paternity
obligations varied widely. Several states developed the duty of paternal
support in a criminal context, as an incident of punishment for bastardy
or fornication.ll Other states did not recognize any duty to support. As
late as 1971, Texas and Idaho refused to impose any support obligation
on an unmarried father. 12 Virginia imposed an obligation only on un-
married fathers who voluntarily and formally acknowledged children as
their own. 13 Other states acknowledged a duty to support but vested the
right to sue in the mother, not the child. 14 In 1949, a North Carolina
court explicitly denied a child's right to have his paternity investigated. 15
In those states that did recognize a duty to support, the amount of
the award was left to the complete discretion of judges. 16 Some states
required that judges not take the child's illegitimacy into account when
setting the support amount,' 7 but other states mandated it.18 Given the
discretion vested in judges, there was very little to prevent a judge from
awarding whatever amount he felt appropriate. There were no rules or
9 See Statute 18 Eliz., ch. 3 (1576); LAWRENCE P. HAMPTON, DISPUTED PATERNITY PRO-
CEEDINGS § 1.02(l)-(3) (2004).
10 See HAMPTON, supra note 9, at § 1.02(1)-(3).
11 HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 109 (1971).
12 Id. at 22.
13 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (1950).
14 IND. CODE ANN. § 3-625 (1968); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-8-5 (1999).
15 Allen v. Hunnicutt, 52 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1949).
16 See KRAUS, supra note 11, at 23.
17 See id.
18 Florida, for instance, had a separate statutory scheme for the support of illegitimate
children, setting the monthly amount of support for illegitimate children under six years old at
$40/mo. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-4 (1966).
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principles guiding the determination. These vagaries are understandable
given the mixed motives of traditional paternity law. As one New Jersey
court summarized: "Filiation statues are generally considered to re-
present an exercise of the police power for the primary purposes of de-
nouncing the misconduct involved, punishing the offender or shifting the
burden of support from society to the child's natural parent."' 19 The
amount of the paternity award and the person entitled to collect it could
vary significantly depending on whether the purpose of the award is to
discourage the underlying sexual conduct, punish the biological father
for not marrying the mother, or support a child in need of resources.
B. CURRENT LAW
In 1984, Congress imposed a degree of uniformity on paternity law.
The Federal Child Support Act of 1984 required all states to allow chil-
dren to sue for paternity until their eighteenth birthday.20 The child's
right to sue is usually coterminous with the mother's,21 but the mother's
right can be limited by contractual agreement. 22 The child's right to sue
cannot be so limited. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
198423 required all states to promulgate guidelines pursuant to which
courts should award support. The state guidelines must take into consid-
eration "all earnings and income of the noncustodial parent" 24 and be
based on "specific descriptive and numeric criteria" in setting and modi-
fying child support award amounts. 25 In reality, what this means is that
all states have tables or formulas that set the child support award as a
percentage of income while allowing for a few discretionary variables to
overcome the presumption in favor of the percentage. In other words, far
from the basic poverty standard which served as the basis for the state's
right to reimbursement in the original paternity suits, children are now
entitled as much to what a father can give them as to what they may
19 State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
20 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) (2000).
21 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8 (2003).
22 Contractual agreements limiting child support are subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure
that children's interests are being served. See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding the mother could not waive all support due to negative effects on
child); Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 441 N.W.2d 734 (Wis. 1989) (holding the mother's lump
sum settlement for child support was not binding against the child). Still, a mother may limit
(often substantially) the amount she would otherwise receive. See Lester v. Lester, 736 So. 2d
1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding the mother's decision to accept extra tuition in lieu of
judicial modification of child support binding).
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667 (2000).
24 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c)(1) (2004). The Family Support Act of 1988 requires that the
guidelines act as rebuttable presumptions. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. 1997).
25 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c)(2) (2004).
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need.2 6 Indeed, in virtually all states, a child's entitlement to child sup-
port is determined as a function of the parent's income, regardless of
what kind of relationship that parent has with the child or with the child's
other parent.2 7
The child's entitlement also often attaches regardless of the biologi-
cal father's actions or intent when creating the child. Many cases sug-
gest that the child's entitlement to support emanates from the mere fact
of biological connection. Thus, children who are born as the result of
acts that made their mothers guilty of statutory rape are still entitled to
support from their biological fathers.2 8 Fathers who were deceived about
birth Control and had no intent or desire to bring a child into the world
are nonetheless fully responsible for child support and have no action in
tort for their emotional or financial injury.29 In Budnick v. Silverman, a
man who entered into a Preconception Agreement in which the mother
agreed not to identify him as the father in any public way (including on
the birth certificate) and not to initiate a paternity action against him, was
nonetheless responsible for child support when the woman did file a pa-
ternity action because the "rights of support and meaningful relationship
belong to the child, not the parent; therefore neither parent can bargain
away those rights."' 30 Thus, much paternity law seems to be based on a
26 Determining what a child "needs" inevitably requires a baseline determination. If we
assume that public assistance actually meets a child's basic needs, then a need-based standard
would obligate a biological father to pay the public assistance amount and no more. If we
assume that public assistance does not adequately meet most children's needs, how does one
determine what need is? In the spousal maintenance context, statutory guidelines usually sug-
gest that courts determine need with reference to the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage. E.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 (2003). Thus, the need baseline is based on what
the spouse enjoyed before. For many children subjects of paternity actions, there is no stan-
dard from before upon which to base a child support award because they have not lived with
the father who they are suing.
27 In one famous case, a biological father claimed that his paternity obligation should be
limited, if imposed at all, because of the mother's misrepresentation about birth control. Find-
ing the mother's actions completely irrelevant, the court held that the child's entitlement to
child support was contingent on the "needs of the child" and the "means of the parents" rather
than the "'fault' or wrongful conduct of one of the parents in causing the child's conception."
In re Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 715 (N.Y. 1983).
28 See County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Ct. App. 1996);
State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); Mercer County Dep't of Soc.
Serv. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (holding that even though father
may have a legitimate statutory rape claim, the father was still legally responsible for the
child).
29 Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 686 (N.M. 2001) (holding the father cannot assert ac-
tions for fraud, breach of contract, or tort to recoup the financial obligations of raising his
unwanted child despite girlfriend's misrepresentation about birth control); Pamela P., 449
N.E.2d at 715 (finding the child support obligation must be determined without "consideration
of the 'fault' or wrongful conduct of one of the parents"); Moorman v. Walker, 773 P.2d 887,
889 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) ("[T]he moral responsibility for creating a human life is not voida-
ble as if sex were a simple contractual transaction.").
30 Budnick, 805 So. 2d at 1113.
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strict liability theory for genetic contribution. One is responsible for
one's genetic offspring no matter what the circumstances of that off-
spring's creation. This kind of strict liability regime makes sense if the
right to support is the child's right and if the child is vested with that
right by virtue of the biological connection per se.
The problem with this theory is that there are many, many instances
in which biological connection alone does not render a man responsible
for the support of his offspring. One can group the instances in which
the state routinely ignores any right a child may have to support from a
biological parent into four categories: (i) the voluntary and involuntary
termination of parental rights, (ii) artificial insemination cases-i.e., fer-
tilization that did not result from sexual intercourse, (iii) cases in which
the law presumes, declares, or finds paternal obligation in the absence of
any evidence that the man obligated actually is biologically related to the
child, and (iv) cases in which the law holds a man responsible as a father
because he has been acting as a father, notwithstanding the knowledge
that he is not biologically related.
C. REJECTING BIOLOGY
1. Legal Termination of Parental Rights
The state may completely and irrevocably sever parental rights if
the state supports its allegations of parental unfitness by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 31 In such a case, the parent loses all rights and obliga-
tions to the child and the child has no claim to the adult's purse.
However, a parent cannot necessarily relinquish his parental rights and
obligations even if that parent claims that he is or would be an abusive
and neglectful parent. A parent who wishes to voluntarily divest himself
or herself of all parental rights and obligations, including child support,
may do so only if the child's other parent also wishes that he relinquish
his rights and if there is another person ready to adopt the child. Some
states make this clear by statute.32 Others rely on case law. 33 In In re
A.B., both mother and father agreed that it would be in the child's best
interest if the biological father's legal status was severed so that he could
not come between the mother and the child.34 The Wisconsin court re-
31 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982).
32 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-220 (Michie 1993). The state may file a termination of paren-
tal rights petition only when it is "attempting to clear a juvenile for permanent [adoption]
placement." ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 1993). Unless there is a contemplated
adoption, Delaware prohibits termination of one parent's rights unless "continuation of the
rights to be terminated will be harmful to the child." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(b)
(1993).
33 See In re A.B. v. P.B., 444 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (applying statutory
factors in considering the best interests of the child).
34 See id. at 417.
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fused the severance because the parents' relationship did not adversely
affect their daughter to an extent sufficient to warrant termination of
child support. 35 The court noted that "[p]arental rights may not be termi-
nated merely to advance the parents' convenience and interests, either
emotional or financial." 36 This means that blood automatically vests an
unwilling man with parental obligation only as long as the state wants to
keep the man obligated. In most cases, the state takes its cues from the
mother. If she wants to continue to keep the biological father liable for
support, the state will not relieve the biological father of his parental
obligation. If she is willing to sever the biological ties and have someone
else assume responsibility, the state will allow severance. Not only
might this seem somewhat arbitrary from the obligor's perspective, but
the child, in whom the support right is vested, has no say. 37 A child who
might want to continue to receive whatever support he or she could get
from a biological father will not be heard if there is another man willing
to support. What this suggests is that although a child may have some
kind of right to be supported, he or she does not have a right to be sup-
ported by a biological parent per se.
2. Reproductive Technology and Fatherhood
The second category of cases in which biology alone does not con-
trol a man's obligation involves artificial insemination. Most states have
statutes divesting a man who voluntarily sells or donates his sperm of all
parental rights and obligations, as long as the insemination using his
sperm is performed by a licensed medical professional. 38 When ama-
teurs succeed in artificial insemination without a professional's aid, "the
preconception intent of the parties governs who are the legal parents after
the child is born." 39 Thus, a man may knowingly assist in the creation of
35 See id. at 419.
36 See id. at 419. One California court, which has not been cited or followed by any
other court, came out differently. In re Joshua M. v. James G., 274 Cal. Rptr. 222, 225 (Ct.
App. 1990) (upholding the father's termination of his parental rights and rejecting the rationale
that "it would be contrary to public policy to place a child in a situation where he or she would
have only one legal parent.").
37 One might argue that the state takes the child's interest into account by using a "best
interest of the child" standard in evaluating all termination and adoption decisions. In practice,
however, adoptions in which there is a willing non-biological parent and a biological parent
who wants to relinquish his rights seem to be approved perfunctorily. At least 42% of all
adoptions are stepparent adoptions. Victor Eugene Flango & Carol R. Flango, How Many
Children Were Adopted in 1992, 74 CHILD WELFARE 1018, 1027 (1995).
38 See, e.g., CALIF. FAM. CODE § 7613 (2003). Most states also have statutory provisions
automatically vesting paternal rights and obligations in a husband who consents to his wife
being artificially inseminated by a licensed professional. See id.
39 See Lori B. Andrews, Legal Aspects of Assisted Reproduction, in IN VrRo FERTILIZA-
TION AND OTHER AsSISTED REPRODUCTION, 541 ANNALS OF N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 668, 674 (How-
ard W. Jones, Jr. & Charlotte Schrader eds., 1988).
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a child, but if his preconception intent is that he not assume responsibil-
ity for the child, he is not responsible, as long as the child is conceived
by means other than sexual intercourse.
Commentators and courts widely endorse the preconception intent
standard as the appropriate one to decide disputed parental rights issues
stemming from reproductive technologies that allow people to conceive
without intercourse and separate genetic contributions from gestational
ones.40 However, it is completely inconsistent with a strict liability re-
gime based on the child's right to support from a biological parent. Bud-
nick v. Silverman,41 the preconception contract case mentioned above,
perfectly illustrates this anomaly.42 Mr. Silverman claimed that the pre-
conception contract in which the mother agreed not to name him or le-
gally pursue him as the father made him nothing other than a sperm
donor, albeit one that donated the "old-fashioned way."'43 He argued that
he had no obligation because the Florida statute relieved sperm donors of
parental rights and responsibilities. 44 The court held that the Florida
sperm donor statute did not apply to conceptions that happen the "old-
fashioned way."'45 In other words, a preconception contract is determina-
tive if the conception happens in a "new-fangled" way, but irrelevant if
the conception happens by means of intercourse. Again, we see arbitrary
enforcement of a child's right to support from a biological parent, but
some assurance that the child will be supported. Most reproductive tech-
40 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that when genetic
consanguinity and giving birth do not coincide in the same woman, the legal mother is the
genetic mother who contracted with a gestational surrogate because the genetic mother was the
woman who intended to bring about the birth of a child whom she intended to raise as her
own); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (following
California courts and holding "in a true 'egg donation' situation, where a woman gestates and
gives birth to a child formed from the egg of another woman with the intent to raise the child
as her own, the birth woman is the 'natural mother' "); Lori B. Andrews, Legal and Ethical
Aspects of New Reproductive Technologies, 29 CLINICAL OBSTETRIcs & GYNECOLOGY 190,
199-200 (1986) (arguing the preconception intent should govern in cases of artificial insemina-
tion); John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a 'Parent'? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 418 (1991) ("[T]he intended parents should
be considered the 'parents' of the child born of [reproductive technologies] .. "); Marjorie
Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 302 ("[L]egal rules governing modem procreative
arrangements and parental status should recognize the importance and legitimacy of individual
... intentions .... "). But see, Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpre-
tive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REV. 835 (2000) (argu-
ing that parental determinations in cases of reproductive technologies should be governed by
existing rules governing parentage determination, many of which do not honor intent, which
would harmonize sexual and technological conception).
41 805 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
42 See id. at 1113.
43 See id. at 1114.
44 See id. (citing 43 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (2001)).
45 See id.
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nologies are expensive. Most of the people using them with the intent of
becoming parents have the ability and desire to support a child. 46 Vest-
ing parental rights in those who spend money with the intent to support a
child helps ensure that the child will be supported.
3. Legal Non-Biological Fathers
The third category of cases in which the biological father is not held
responsible for the support of his child involves the law, by presumption
or declaration, making someone else the father. The most common ex-
ample of this is the common law presumption that the husband of a wo-
man who gives birth to a child is the father of the child.47 For many
years, Lord Mansfield's Rule prohibited either spouse from giving testi-
mony that would cast doubt on whether the husband was the child's fa-
ther,48 and a putative father lacked standing to challenge the paternity of
a husband.49 Thus, for most intents and purposes, the marital presump-
tion of the husband's paternity was irrebuttable.
The extent to which the modern marital presumption can be rebutted
varies from state to state.50 In most states, the husband, the wife, and the
putative biological father have the opportunity to rebut, but that opportu-
nity is temporally limited.51 A husband who has cause to believe that a
child might not be biologically related to him, but who fails to question
biological paternity once he has reason to, can be held responsible for
child support.52 Comparably, a man who knew that he was the likely
biological father, but failed to bring an action in time, can be barred from
46 The exception to this is simple insemination of a woman who wishes to bear a child
herself. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he
California Legislature has afforded unmarried as well as married women a statutory vehicle for
obtaining semen for artificial insemination without fear that the donor may claim paternity
.... "). This is relatively inexpensive and increasingly popular among unmarried women. If
there is no husband who, by statute, becomes the father of the artificially inseminated baby, the
responsibility for supporting the child falls solely on the woman. See id. That child becomes
the modem equivalent of filius nullius. See infra text accompanying notes 102-03.
47 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (a) (2004) (codifying the common law presumption); LES-
LIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 995 (2d ed. 2000) ("Today, all states, by
statute or common law, provide that a married woman's husband is at least rebuttably pre-
sumed to be the father of her children.").
48 Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 291, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
49 See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 47, at 1052.
50 Id. at 995-96.
51 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540-7541.
52 Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, 81 (Md. 2000) (denying a husband the right to
challenge his child support obligation in part because he accepted responsibility for children,
despite having had a vasectomy prior to the children's conception). See also In re Paternity of
Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 497 (Mass. 2001) (holding that a man who was not mother's husband
was not able to challenge his paternity more than five years after having acknowledged pater-
nity while having reason to believe he might not be child's biological father).
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claiming any parental rights he might want to establish. 53 As a matter of
constitutional law, the Supreme Court has said that a putative father has
no constitutional right to establish his paternity even if he has a relation-
ship with the child, as long as the mother is married to someone else and
wishes to stay married to that someone else.54 By the same token, a
mother who wishes to bar a biological father from asserting paternity on
the basis of the marital presumption is free to do so only if her marriage
is still intact.55 If she is separated or having difficulty with the man
presumed to be the father of the child, the biological father may have
standing to sue.56 Thus, a judge evaluates the state of the marriage,57 and
the biological father's rights and obligations depend on what a judge
thinks of the strength of a marriage that the biological father has nothing
to do with. No one has an obligation to tell the child any of the facts that
might be relevant to the child's right to support from his or her biological
parent. Not only does this make it highly unlikely that a child will pur-
sue his right to support from a biological parent, it makes it highly un-
likely that the child will learn the biological facts. However,
preferencing stability over information in this way may make it more
likely that the child will be adequately supported. Men who live with
children are likely to help pay for them, regardless of whether those men
are biologically related to the child. 58 Vesting paternity in the man living
with the child may help ensure support.
The marital presumption is not the only presumption that vests pa-
ternal rights. Most paternity statutes also presumptively name the man
listed on the child's birth certificate 59 and/or a man who "receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child" as
the father. 60 In cases in which two of these presumption clash or where
one of the presumptions clashes with biological evidence, courts often
resolve the issue with reference to a best interest of the child analysis, not
by virtue of a blood test.61 It is not uncommon for courts to simply
53 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(1) (West 1999).
54 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
55 See B.S. v. T.M., 782 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (finding the marital
presumption's purpose is to protect the institution of marriage, and, in this case, the application
of the presumption would not advance preservation of the appellants' marriage).
56 See id.
57 Id.
58 See Frank F. Furstenberg, JR., Good Dads-Bad Dads: Two Faces of Fatherhood, in
THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 203-04 (John L. Palmer & Isabel
V. Sawhill eds., 1988).
59 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ar. 45/5 (a)(2) (2003); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 761 l(c)(l) (2004) (creating a presumption if the man named on the birth certificate and the
mother have attempted to marry after the child's birth).
60 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (2000).
61 See N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Colo. 2000) ("[T]the best interests of the child
must be of paramount concern throughout a paternity proceeding, and therefore, must be ex-
2004]
14 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
refuse to order blood tests in a case of clashing presumptions.62 The
courts do not want to know the biological answer. Thus, a biological
father's responsibility may depend on whether a judge thinks that some-
one else, albeit someone by law presumed to be the father, is a better
father. Again, the child does not appear to have a right to support from a
biological father, so much as he or she has a right to support from some-
one in addition to a mother.
The Final Judgment Rule also effectively holds non-biologically re-
lated men responsible for children whom they can prove are not their
own. Once a child support or paternity order is entered, it is very diffi-
cult to re-open it, even with definitive biological evidence. 63 Many
times, courts simply refuse to order the blood tests that would make the
biological evidence compelling. 64 Contemporary judicial refusals to or-
der blood tests parallel the historic refusals to admit testimony about "ac-
cess"'65 and they strongly suggest that the law treats paternity as a social
construction not a biological fact. The proposed Uniform Parentage Act
limits anyone who has formally acknowledged paternity to two years
within which he can try to rescind that acknowledgment, and then only
on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. 66 Once again,
stability trumps information, but the child's right to support from some-
one in addition to the mother is protected.
plicitly considered as a part of the ... analysis that is used to resolve competing presumptions
of fatherhood."); Davis v. LaBrec, 549 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2001) (holding the best interests of the
child standard, rather than the parental fitness standard, applied to putative biological father's
action to establish paternity).
62 In re Kiana A. v. Mario A., 93 Cal. App. 4th 1109 (2001) (declining to order genetic
testing of child's paternity where mother's former cohabitant enjoyed presumption of paternity
based upon his long-standing parental relationship with child and that presumption would have
outweighed evidence of biological paternity); see also Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Serv. v.
R.K., 757 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (requiring former boyfriend to continue to
pay child support and equitably estopping him from denying paternity where boyfriend had
signed admission of paternity over ten years ago and mother and child had relied upon boy-
friend's support, although genetic testing revealed that boyfriend was not child's biological
father).
63 See Ex parte State ex rel. J.Z., 668 So. 2d 566, 569 (Ala. 1995) ("The policy in favor
of finality [of paternity judgments] means that a prior adjudication should not be subject to
relitigation in the absence of truly compelling circumstances ...."); Richard B. v. Sandra
B.B., 625 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("[T]he unequivocal trend... has been to
zealously safeguard the welfare, stability and best interests of the child by rejecting untimely
challenges affecting his or her legitimacy.") (quoting Matter of Ettore I. v. Angela D., 513
N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
64 See In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 496 (Mass. 2001) (suggesting that a
refusal to order blood tests would be appropriate in light of "the weight of authority enforcing
the finality of paternity judgments").
65 See id.
66 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 308 (2000).
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4. Functional Non-Biological Fathers
Finally, some courts hold a man responsible for child support be-
cause the mother and child have come to rely on that support. Origi-
nally, courts debated this issue in the context of stepparents. 67 Some
stepparents who had provided support were not allowed to withhold it
after divorce if the child and mother relied on that support.68 Other
courts, worried about the incentive such rulings could have on potential
sources of support, did not hold stepparents responsible even if the
mother and child had relied on the support. 69 Today, genetic testing has
greatly expanded the class of cases in which reliance arguments are
made. Because it is now possible to positively exclude biologically unre-
lated men who have acted as fathers, many cases now involve attempts
by men, who previously thought they were the father, to absolve them-
selves of support obligations when they definitely learn that they are not
biologically related to the child. In these cases, some courts look to
whether the functional father took affirmative steps to prevent the mother
from locating the biological father.70 Others simply require a finding
that the child or mother detrimentally relied on the de facto parent.
7
'
Technically, these courts estop men from denying responsibility for a
child because allowing them to do so would hurt the child. Often, these
men have been deceived into thinking that they were the father, but they
67 Stepparents are always required to support children for whom they are acting in loco
parentis during their marriage. Thus, there is no question that a stepfather has some responsi-
bility to help clothe and feed a child with whom he is living. The harder question is whether
that obligation continues after the stepfather and the child have separated.
68 See Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
69 See Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 552 (Md. 1986) (holding the stepfather, who cared
for child as his own, was not equitably estopped from denying paternity because "[s]uch con-
duct is consistent with this State's public policy of strengthening the family . . . [and he]
should not be penalized for his conduct"); In re Marriage of A.J.N. & J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68,
71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (Voluntary support of non-marital children or stepchildren "should be
encouraged rather than discouraged through the possible consequence of becoming perma-
nently financially obligated for child support.").
70 See W. v. W., 779 A.2d 716, 721 (Conn. 2001) (holding the stepfather was equitably
estopped from denying paternity and child support where husband acted consistently as child's
father, husband destroyed documents necessary to institute paternity proceedings that had orig-
inally prevented wife from attempting to contact putative biological father for support, and
child had relied on husband for support and care).
71 See id.; see also Wright v. Newman, 467 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. 1996) (requiring the
boyfriend to support child under the doctrine of promissory estoppel because the boyfriend had
promised the mother and child that he would assume all of the obligations and responsibilities
of fatherhood and based on those promises, mother refrained from identifying and seeking
support from the child's natural father); Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, 83 (Md. 2000)
(holding the husband was not equitably estopped from denying obligation to pay child support
because, even though wife relied on husband's representations that he would provide support
for children, the reliance did not cause a financial detriment because wife failed to demonstrate
that she made any effort to locate biological father); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775 (N.J.
1985).
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are still found responsible if the child relied on the mistaken fact of fa-
therhood. 72 In this class of cases, knowledge of, availability of, and li-
quidity of the biological father can be crucial. If the biological father can
be found and is able to support his child, courts may absolve the func-
tional father of any obligation.73 If the biological father is unknown,
unavailable, or broke, the functional father will be ordered to pay. Thus,
the functional father's obligation is dependent on the availability and fi-
nancial condition of a man whom he has nothing to do with and may well
have never met. Courts determine paternity in a manner that protects a
child's right to be supported, but not the right to be supported by a bio-
logical parent.
D. RATIONALE FOR PATERNITY LAW
The above analysis suggests that far from reifying a child's right to
support from a biological parent, what paternity doctrine endorses is a
child's right to support from two parents. Paternity law is about
biparenting as much as it is about biology. The rationale for such a re-
gime might be articulated this way: A child is best off with two parents
and if no other man fills the role, the biologically connected man should.
There are several problems with this rationale. First, it finds minimal
support in history. As mentioned, the original justification for paternity
law was rooted in the state's fiscal needs. The state may have hoped that
the legal obligation to support would force a marriage (and thereby se-
cure two parents), but the legal obligation itself did not create a father.74
Biologically-related men owed support but they often could not petition
for custody or visitation.75 It has only been recently that unwed fathers
who had been adjudged responsible could claim any paternal rights. 76
Traditionally, a paternity suit did not give a child a parent; it gave her a
paycheck.
Things are different today. Men adjudged to be fathers can exercise
parental rights, so it is generally more accurate to view the paternity suit
as giving a child a parent in addition to a paycheck. Still, it gives a child
72 See In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 497 (Mass. 2001); Commonwealth ex
rel. Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
73 See Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Servs. v. R.K., 757 A.2d 319, 327 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2000) (citing Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984)).
74 See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMm.y, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800,
600-50 (1977). Particularly among propertyless classes, the mother was often content with the
financial settlement alone. See id. at 641.
75 See KRAUSE, supra note 11, at 28-31. Before Stanley v. Illinois, unwed fathers had no
constitutionally protected parental rights to their children even if the mother died. 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (holding the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that unwed
father be granted hearing on his fitness as parent before his children could be taken from him
in dependency proceeding after death of the children's natural mother).
76 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 45/2-45/3 (2003).
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an unwilling parent, and it is quite unclear why that is fair to the unwill-
ing parent or good for the child. There are three possible answers. First,
holding an unwilling man responsible is appropriate punishment for the
underlying conduct. Second, children have a moral claim to their biolog-
ical father's resources. Third, the unwilling man assumed the risk of
pregnancy and can therefore be held responsible. The first of these theo-
ries is father-driven. The second of these theories is child-driven. 77 The
third idea-assumption of risk-collapses into the first two.
1. Punishment of the Father
Unquestionably, the punishment rationale was very much at the core
of early paternity doctrine. As a New Jersey court stated in 1967, "Filia-
tion statutes... denounc[e] the misconduct involved [and] punish[ ] the
offender." 78 Various feminist scholars still defend paternity doctrine as a
way to curb irresponsible male sexual behavior.79 Paternity doctrine also
punishes men who cannot be considered irresponsible, however. It
makes male victims of statutory rape responsible for child support8° and
carries no exception for male victims of deceit and fraud. More basi-
cally, it punishes men for engaging in sex, an activity that enjoys consid-
erable constitutional protection, 81 although that right is probably limited
for non-procreative sex. 82 Given the special status of non-procreative
sex, it seems odd to punish people who engage in procreative, but not
non-procreative sex. Admittedly, men can and should use contraceptives
more often if they do not wish to be fathers, but birth control does fail,
and couples routinely rely on a woman's representation as to her own use
of birth control. Condoms cannot completely solve the problem of un-
wanted fatherhood any more than birth control pills and diaphragms can
solve the problem of unwanted motherhood. To the extent that paternity
77 1 am grateful to Naomi Cahn for underscoring this distinction.
78 See State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
79 See NgA.cy E. Dowo, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 115-19 (2000); Nancy D. Polikoff,
The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbian and
Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 375, 375-76 (1996).
80 See County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Ct. App. 1996);
State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); Mercer County Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (holding that even though
father may have a legitimate statutory rape claim, the father was still legally responsible for the
child).
81 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
82 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1421-31, 1435
(2d ed. 1988); David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contraception, Abortion, Absti-
nence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299 (2000); Sylvia A. Law, Homo-
sexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187 (1988); Robin West,
Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin 's Freedom's Law, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1313, 1325 (1997).
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doctrine is still rooted in punishment, we punish men who, in many in-
stances, have done nothing wrong.
2. Entitlement of the Child
The other rationale for holding unwilling men responsible as fa-
thers-that children have a moral claim to their father's resources-may
have more weight. Commentators talk in terms of the child's "natural"
right to his father's resources. 83 Causation, not punishment, seems to
underlie this rationale. "But for" the father's sexual activity, the child
would not have been born. Therefore, the child has a right to the father's
financial support. The problem with this formulation is that given the
constitutional treatment of reproductive decision-making, the mother is
the far better proximate cause of the child's existence. She has signifi-
cantly more control over the decision to become a parent. If part of what
the Constitution protects is the right of "the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to . . . beget a
child,"' 84 the Constitution protects women better than men. Once the
child is conceived, a man has no right to terminate the pregnancy,85 and
the law will hold him accountable as father even if he had no past and
has no present intent or desire to parent. He cannot relinquish parental
status unless the mother and the state are willing to let him relinquish
that status.86
This disparate treatment of men and women may be justified. The
significant emotional and physical burdens of pregnancy 8 7 make any de-
cision to beget a child necessarily much more arduous for women than
men. Thus, it is much more important that a woman be free from state
interference into the decision to beget a child because her process of
begetting is much more difficult. Moreover, as several scholars have
83 Blackstone, although a strong advocate of the marital presumption, also suggests that
the duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural
law. 1 WILLIAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS 446-47; June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The
Genetic Tie (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("A child has an unequivocal moral
claim on those responsible for conception who have not made alternative provisions for the
child's well-being.")
84 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) ("[I]n some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same
character as the decision to use contraception, to which Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, and Carey v. Population Services International afford constitutional protection. We
have no doubt as to the correctness of those decisions.").
85 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-95 (holding that requiring spousal notification imposed an
undue burden to obtain an abortion and was thus invalid).
86 See supra Section I.C.1.
87 Eileen L. McDonagh, My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitutional Right to




argued and as many more have observed, mothering and fathering, at
least as constructed and lived in this society, are usually very different
tasks. Mothering a child who has already been born is much more emo-
tionally and physically taxing than fathering that child. 88 Given the fi-
nancial tradeoffs that women routinely make when they mother, it is also
more expensive than fathering.8 9 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
found, men and women are often not similarly situated with regard to
parenthood. 90
The fact that most fathers are not mothers does not necessarily jus-
tify making unwilling men fathers, however. The truth is that we force
fatherhood on men in a way we do not force motherhood on women, and
we do so in the name of protecting a child's right to support from biolog-
ical parents, even though the law routinely ignores, obfuscates, or simply
rejects biology as the basis for parenthood. As we saw in Section I.C,
the law does not protect a child's right to support from a biological par-
ent, though it may protect a right to support from someone in addition to
the mother. Why should the child have a moral entitlement to support
from a biological parent only sometimes?
3. Assumption of Risk
Perhaps the answer lies in an assumption of risk. When engaging in
sexual intercourse, men assume the risk that a court will not find some-
one better suited to be the father of any potential child. Perhaps regard-
less of whether they have done anything wrong by engaging in
intercourse and regardless of how much more say a woman has in bring-
ing the child into the world, men should still share some of the risk of
unwanted pregnancies. Forcing men to assume this risk would help deter
them from engaging in irresponsible sexual behavior and would honor
whatever duty flows from blood connection.
88 FINEMAN, supra note 2; Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child
Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 142-53 (1992).
89 Women tend to mother by sacrificing job opportunities and career advancement while
men typically father by not sacrificing those things. See generally Joan C. Williams, Decon-
structing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
90 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 55, 68 (2001) (holding statute that distinguished
between citizen mothers and citizen fathers of illegitimate children did not violate equal pro-
tection because knowledge of child and fact of parenthood is established at birth for mothers
but not fathers); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 435 (1998) (holding statute that required
additional proof-of-paternity whenever the citizen parent of illegitimate child is child's father,
did not violate equal protection because citizen mother acquires necessary substantive contact
at the child's birth, but father must show he acted, before child turned 18, in manner sufficient
to establish paternity); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983) (holding that biological
fathers are not necessarily entitled to block an adoption of their biological child if they do not
have a relationship with mother and/or child).
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Accepting the legitimacy of either of these assumption of risk argu-
ments, which are essentially deterrence and moral obligation arguments,
hardly requires endorsing paternity doctrine, however. First, if the con-
cern is deterrence, why do we choose to deter with paternal status? The
involuntary imposition of the status of fatherhood on unwilling men says
something rather disturbing about our notion of fatherhood. When we
use paternal status as a deterrent, we imbue that status with a negativity
that diminishes those men who fulfill the role willingly, honorably, and
lovingly. It is odd that we "deter" the reckless philanderer by imposing
on him the same obligation we impose on a man who purposefully helps
bring a child into the world and willingly nurtures that child. We impov-
erish children's and adults' understanding of fatherhood when we make
it only about resources. 9'
Second, if the concern is moral obligation to blood dependents, one
must ask why we treat the moral obligation to young dependents as so
vastly different from the moral obligation to old dependents. The Social
Security system in this country makes the dependency of the elderly a
social concern. The young and able-bodied pay money into an entitle-
ment program for the elderly. 92 In contrast, paternity doctrine and the
state's remarkably stingy support of children make children's depen-
dency a private concern. It is hard to see why an adult's moral obligation
to a child he never wanted or intended to have is greater than his moral
obligation to parents who probably wanted and almost certainly sacri-
ficed for him. The obsession the law seems to have with protecting a
child's "right" to support from someone in addition to the mother93 helps
keep children's dependency private; but why? We collectivize our moral
responsibility for the elderly, so why do we refuse to do the same for the
young?
94
Third, it is not at all clear that enforced fatherhood in these circum-
stances is good for the child even if it does provide the child with some
resources. 95 The harm that comes to the child from the animosity be-
91 A tax on biological fathers, as mentioned in the Introduction and as discussed infra in
the text accompanying notes 341-43 could adequately serve a deterrent function without mak-
ing unwanted men fathers.
92 For a discussion of how the social security benefit system actually operates, see gener-
ally Regina T. Jefferson, Privatization: Not the Answer for Social Security Reform, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. Riv. 1287 (2001).
93 See supra Section I.C.
94 As also mentioned in the Introduction and as discussed more fully infra in the text
accompanying notes 336-39, most of the rest of the industrialized world does collectivize
moral responsibility for the young.
95 See Sara McLanahan et al., Child-Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being:
Greater Security or Greater Conflict, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 239, 254
(Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994). Studies of unmarried women's attempt to collect child
support suggest that the costs to the children stemming from friction between the parents may
outweigh the benefits gained by any added support the biological father is able to give. See id.
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tween parents can easily outweigh whatever benefit more resources
bring.96 In all likelihood, the child would be better off with resources
emanating directly from the state rather than from a reluctant father who
is not likely to pay very much 97 or very consistently 98 and is unlikely to
assume a meaningful role as father. 99 If our concern is children, why we
do we assume that children will be better off with unwilling and resistant
fathers?
The inability to answer these questions convincingly suggests that
none of the rationales for biological paternity doctrine survive scrutiny.
If the current doctrine is rooted, as the traditional doctrine was, in reliev-
ing the state of the burden to support, only those biological fathers of
children receiving public assistance should be liable. If the current doc-
trine is rooted in punishment, we should not hold male victims of rape
and deceit liable, and we are left having to explain why behavior that the
state has no business regulating becomes behavior that the state can pun-
ish merely because of the (common) failure of a birth control method.
We also must ask whether the punishment of fatherhood fits the crime of
procreative sex, and more fundamentally, whether we want fatherhood to
be considered a punishment. If the doctrine is rooted in the child's
needs, then what the father owes should be a function of other resources
available to the child. A child-centered approach would make both the
award and the determination of obligation a function of the child's needs,
not the father's ability. If the current doctrine is rooted in the child's
96 Id.
97 In one study which followed families from the birth of their child through age five,
approximately two of every ten unmarried fathers were unemployed the week before being
interviewed and 56% of unwed fathers lived below or just above the poverty level. Sara
McLanahan et al., The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, Baseline National Report
3, 11 (Bendheim-Thoman Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, 2003), available at http://
crcw.princeton.edu/files/nationalreport.pdf. Researchers hypothesize that over one quarter of
unwed fathers are not steadily employed. Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, For
Richer or Poorer?: Marriage as an Anti-Poverty Strategy in the United States 13-14 (Bend-
heim-Thoman Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 01-17-FF, 2003),
available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP0l-17-FF-Sigle.pdf.
98 See Timothy Grail, U.S. Census Bureau, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their
Child Support 2 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-217.pdf. Of
custodial mothers who were due child support, only 45.9% have received payment in full. Id.
Of custodial mothers, the average child support received was only $2,689 in comparison to the
average child support due, which was $4,802. Thus, approximately 40% of all child support
award money has not been received by custodial mothers. Id.
99 Fathers who never were or cease to stay married to their children's mother usually
drift out of their children's lives. See DowD, supra note 79, at 204. This trend is all the more
likely with fathers who are not married to and not romantically involved with the child's
mother because those unwed mothers are more likely than wed mothers to oppose paternal
involvement. I-Fen Lin & Sara S. McLanahan, Parents' Judgments About Nonresident Fa-
thers' Obligations and Rights 16 (Bendheim-Thoman Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing,
Working Paper No. 00-03-FF, 2000), available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/
WPOO-03-FF-Lin.pdf.
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moral entitlement to support from his or her biological father, one cannot
explain the myriad of presumptions that preclude the child from suing
and often from even finding his or her biological father, and one must
confront the fact that we force this moral obligation on men in a way that
we do not force it on women. We also must ask why we make the par-
ent-to-child obligation to support private, while we make the child-to-
parent obligation to support public, and whether a child is actually better
off with an unwilling father.
The next section explores an alternative theory that does a better job
of explaining legal fatherhood. It suggests that a man's explicit or im-
plicit agreement with a child's mother provides a more comprehensive
framework for understanding paternity.
II. CONTRACTING FOR PATERNITY
Perhaps surprisingly, the law is remarkably comfortable letting con-
tract confer parental status. Indeed, to the extent that the marital pre-
sumption used to reign supreme, contract as a basis for paternity has
more historical support than does biology. 10 0 The law of legitimacy
(which lets the marital contract determine paternal relationships) predates
the law of paternity by at least a thousand years.101 Today, it is contract
that currently governs the law of paternity in almost all cases involving
non-traditional means of conception and it is increasingly contract that
governs the law of paternity in most cases involving men who have acted
like fathers toward a child. This section explores the reliance on contract
in more detail.
A. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION AS CONTRACT
For most of western history, marriage, not blood, determined father-
hood. Evolutionary biologists may tell us that genes determine father-
hood,' 0 2 but the law has always told us something else. For the Romans
and the pre-sixteenth century British, many children simply had no fa-
thers. A child born out of wedlock was filius nullius, or child of no-
body.' 0 3 As mentioned earlier, a child born in wedlock was the child of
100 For a brief discussion of the extent to which it is appropriate to treat marriage as a
contract, see infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
101 See Joseph Cullen Ayer, Jr., Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1902).
102 See generally, RICHARD DAWINI'S, THE SELFISH GENE (1989); ROBERT WIGr, THE
MORAL ANIMAL (1994). Close reading of the evolutionary biology literature also reveals that
the best reproductive strategy for men is actually to have some offspring whom they do not
father, that is, to have some offspring who are provided for by other men. For an explication,
see Katharine K. Baker, Gender, Genes and Choice: A Comparative Look at Feminism, Evolu-
tion and Economics, 80 N.C. L. REv. 465 (2002).
103 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 447; Ayer, supra note 101. The patriarchy
implicit in the illegitimacy doctrine is implicit in the phrasefilius nullius. An illegitimate child
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the husband unless evidence showed that the husband had no "access" to
his wife, 10 4 but neither husband or wife could testify to non-access. 10 5
Moreover, a child born two weeks into a marriage was just as legitimate
as the one born 40 weeks into the marriage. Although there were dis-
turbing racial exceptions to the marital presumption and some men might
have been able to establish illegitimacy of a marital child, 10 6 the law was
indisputably comfortable with letting marriage determine paternity. A
man became a father by marrying, and only by marrying, a woman.
There may have been both stability and practicality reasons for let-
ting marriage be the arbiter of paternity. Asking biological questions, the
answers to which can disrupt families, crush existing relationships and
reveal disquieting truths about the reality of sexual behavior that may do
more harm than good.' 0 7 Moreover, historically, it was often impossible
to get an accurate answer to paternity questions. Before genetic test-
ing, 10 8 proving paternity was even harder than proving other notoriously
difficult to prove sexual acts, like adultery or rape. With paternity, the
question is not just whether a sexual act took place, but whether the par-
ticular sexual act was the one that led to the birth of a child. With no real
way to ascertain a reliable answer, there was little point in asking the
question.
Marriage was the arbiter because the law needed some arbiter; bio-
logical questions were too messy. One might ask though why the law
needed an arbiter at all. Why insist that certain children have legal fa-
was considered the child of nobody even though it was perfectly clear who his or her mother
was. It was only the father who was missing.
104 See In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930); supra notes 47-66 and accompany-
ing text. Originally in England, if a husband was "within the four seas of England" during the
period of gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting doubt on his paternity. See
In re Findlay, 170 N.E. at 472.
105 See Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative
Power, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495, 498-99 (1993).
106 See id. As Professor Fellows insightfully details, 19th century American courts did
not apply the marital presumption in cases involving children who had African-American fea-
tures. See id. at 500. Moreover, the fact that some people could testify to non-access, even if
the husband and wife could not, suggests that the courts wanted to afford married men some
protection against having to support children who did not share their genetic material. See id.
at 507.
107 KRAUSE, supra note 11, at 106. Paternity cases have always been "sordid spectacles",
and the parties on all sides often wanted to avoid them. See id. (quoting MAXINE B. VIRTUE,
FAMILY CASES IN COURT 36-37 (1956)).
108 Although various forms of blood testing appeared first in the 1930s, and experts inter-
preting those tests often gave statistical probabilities that sounded determinative (i.e., a 95%
chance of paternity), most of that testing could not prove paternity. See Ira Mark Ellman &
David Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?,
54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131, 1135, 1141 (1979). It has only been the last 10 years' advances in
DNA matching that have allowed us to reliably determine paternity. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET
AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 19-1.4
(1997).
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thers when children of unmarried mothers did not? The answer seems to
be in part to protect (at least some) children and in part to respect the
institution of marriage. In his Commentaries, Blackstone writes that
these two goals were actually one: "[T]he main end and design of mar-
riage [is] to ascertain and fix upon some certain person to whom the care,
the protection, the maintenance, and the education of the children should
belong. .".."109 This view suggests that, at its core, the agreement to
marry was about children as much, if not more, than it was about hus-
band and wife. The state supported marriage because it was through
marriage that children got support. If the "main end and design" of the
agreement to marry was to support children, then sub-agreements or as-
sumptions about fidelity needed not trump the primary obligation to sup-
port children.
An early British court deciding an awkward legitimacy case in 1304
placed the sanctity of marriage, not children, at the core of the marital
presumption.' 10 The court would not question the paternity of a child
born to a woman whose husband had been abroad for three years because
"the privity between a man and his wife cannot be known." 1 ' In other
words, the law treated the decision to marry as primary. It was not the
law's place to interfere with the unit created by marriage, regardless of
what transpired during the marriage.
In Goodright v. Moss, Lord Mansfield seemed to echo this view,
though he also emphasized the collateral benefit of supporting chil-
dren.11 2 The bar to husband and wife testifying about access was "a rule
founded in decency, morality and policy, that they shall not be permitted
to say after marriage, that they have had no connection, and therefore
that the offspring is spurious." ' 1 3 Lord Mansfield, like the court in 1304,
argued that marriage links two people together and the law has no place
weakening that link. 1 4 Marriage is a contract to be together and regard-
less of whether the wife was also "together" with someone else, she is
still in a unit with the husband." 15
To be sure, honoring contract was not the only reason for preferenc-
ing marriage over blood. Using marriage instead of blood blood also
helped ensure the orderly distribution of property. Indeed, one might
reject Blackstone's view that marriage was an institution designed prima-
rily to protect children and instead argue that marriage was an institution
109 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 443.
I 10 See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR., ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 35 n.23
(1988) (citing Y.B. 32 & 33 Edw. I (R.S.) 60, 63 (1304)).
I' Id






designed primarily to facilitate the orderly distribution of property. It is
far easier for a probate court to identify the children of an intestate's
marriage than all the children whom the intestate may have begotten.
Moreover, given marriage's ability to regulate women's sexual behavior,
marriage was a way of helping steer a man's property to his biological
issue. As long as wives were not allowed to engage in sexual relations
with anyone other than their husbands, husbands could fairly safely as-
sume that children of the marriage were "their" children. The problem,
of course, is that infidelity is as old as the institution of marriage.' 16 The
marital presumption of paternity and the evidentiary rules about testify-
ing to access were necessary because everyone has always acknowledged
that marriage is an imperfect protector of biological inheritance lines.
A full historical discussion of the reasons for the elevation of mar-
riage over blood is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear though
is that by preferencing marriage, the law was preferencing a kind of con-
tract. Of course, "marriage ...is something more than a mere con-
tract,'' t7 and I do not mean to suggest that contract doctrine can or
should be used to govern all aspects of the marital relationship. The law
has never done so, and there are sound reasons for it to continue to adopt
contract principles reluctantly.' " 8 The inescapable fact, though, is that
the joint decision to enter into a marriage looks more like contract than
anything else." 19 It may be a contract to enter into a status,' 20 but the
agreement to enter into that status must be a mutual one that involves
rights and duties for both parties. 2 1 Traditionally, by agreeing to enter
into that status, husband and wife were agreeing to support and raise any
children born to the marriage. Because husband and wife agreed to raise
children, they were bound to be father and mother, regardless of whether
the children born to the marriage were biologically related.
116 Indeed, infidelity is possibly older than marriage. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy has documented
how female apes who are supposed to be "loyal" to the male head of their troop, often stray in
search of other companions. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Empathy, Polyandry and the Myth of the Coy
Female, in FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SCIENCE 119, 119-20 (Ruth Bleier ed., 1986).
'17 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
118 See Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. Rav. 1365, 1373 (2001) (contending that people do not think of relationships like
marriage in contract terms).
119 See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211 ("[I]t [is] of contract that the relation should be estab-
lished .... ) (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483 (1863)).
120 Id.
121 See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 118 (3d ed.
1998) (explaining that a marriage is voidable if a court determines that either party made a
misrepresentation concerning the essentials of marriage and thereby induced consent).
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B. THE NEW-FANGLED WAY: PARENTHOOD BY EXPRESS CONTRACT
Many children today are conceived by means other than sexual in-
tercourse.1 22 Courts, with the weight of scholarly commentary behind
them, almost always use contract to identify the children's parents. In
the most common case, the biological father of a child, born by virtue of
insemination through a sperm bank, signs away his rights and obligations
as a father. The law honors the sperm donor's intent not to be a father
and the contract in which he makes that intent known. Surrogacy con-
tracts, which have gotten considerably more media attention than sperm
donation contracts, are also usually enforced. The degree of regulation
varies from state to state, but few states ban surrogacy contracts and most
states enforce them.' 2 3 With traditional surrogacy contracts, in which a
woman enters a contract with a man who provides the sperm which she
then uses to impregnate herself, the law honors the traditional surrogate's
intent not to be a mother, despite her genetic connection to the child.
The law finds the traditional surrogate's intent in the surrogacy con-
tract. 124 When it honors gestational surrogacy contracts, in which a sur-
rogate mother gestates another woman's ovum fertilized with a man's
sperm, the law allows the gestational surrogate to sign away whatever
parental rights she might acquire by virtue of her gestational labor. It
also allows the contract to bestow parental rights on the male and female
genetic contributors. It is thus through the contract, not the genetic con-
tribution, that the "intended" parents acquire their parental rights.
Johnson v. Calvert, 125 probably the best-known and most important
gestational surrogacy case, makes this perfectly clear. In Johnson, a hus-
band and wife brought suit seeking declaration that they were legal par-
ents of a child born of a surrogate mother in whom couple's fertilized
egg had been implanted. 26 The court was faced with conflicting pre-
sumptions of motherhood under the California statute. 127 The surrogate
122 Exact figures are impossible to generate because there is no registration or notification
requirement for sperm donation or, in many states, surrogacy arrangements.
123 See Table IV State Laws on Surrogacy, available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/islt/
TABLEIV.htm (providing an overview of state surrogacy laws).
124 The primacy of the contract over the genetic contribution is evident in the courts'
treatment of the men in these situations. If surrogacy situations were really treated as instances
in which the sperm donor impregnated the surrogate the "old-fashioned way," then a surro-
gate's husband would, in almost all states, be entitled to a presumption of paternity. As indi-
cated supra note 61, many courts use a best interest of the child standard to adjudicate
competing claims to paternity when more than one man enjoys the presumption of paternity as
both men would in a traditional surrogacy contract case (one by virtue of providing the sperm;
the other by being married to the surrogate mother). Yet even in In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227, 1240-55 (N.J. 1988), a case which struck down surrogacy contracts, the court never
thought about bestowing parental rights on the surrogate mother's husband.
125 851 P.2d 776, 782-83 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).




acquired parental status by virtue of "her having given birth to the
child;"'128 and the genetic mother acquired her parental status by virtue of
the blood test. The court found that "[b]ecause two women each have
presented acceptable proof of maternity, we do not believe this case can
be decided without enquiring into the parties' intentions as manifested in
the surrogacy agreement."' 129 In letting contract interpretation guide their
decision about parental rights, the court relied on commentators who
have emphasized the reliance interest 130 and the expectations' 3 ' created
in the intending parents by the contract.
The Johnson court also invoked a "but for" causation argument, but
the court did not rule that "but for" the Johnsons' actions, the child
would not have been born. 132 Instead the court wrote, "[b]ut for their
acted-on intention, the child would not exist."'133 Intent, not action, was
at the core of the decision. Thus, the court held that when there are
competing presumptions of motherhood under the California Act, "she
who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring
about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the
natural mother."' 134 The Johnson court was confident enough of its anal-
ysis to go on to declare that "in a true 'egg donation' situation, where a
woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the egg of another
woman with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is
the natural mother under California law."'135 Less than a year later, a
New York court faced Johnson's very issue. 136 Completely persuaded
by Johnson's analysis, the court held that a gestational mother, who had
intended to raise the children born from her as her own, was the natural
mother even though she had no genetic connection to the children. 137
Courts also rely on intent to determine parenthood in artificial in-
semination cases involving no written contract. 38 In the absence of ex-
128 CAL. CIr. CODE § 7003(1) (1993) (repealed 1994).
129 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
130 See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 416 (1991) ("The intended parents
rely, both financially and emotionally, to their detriment on the promises of the biological
progenitors and gestational host.").
131 Shultz, supra note 40, at 300-03 ("Where [ ]intentions are deliberate, explicit and bar-
gained for, where they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations, as is the case in techno-
logically-assisted reproductive arrangements, they should be honored.").
132 See id.
133 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (noting that using a "but for their action" test would not have
resolved the dispute because "but for" the surrogate's action, the child would not have been
born either).
134 Id.
135 Id. at n.10.
136 McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
137 See id.
138 See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); R.C.
v. J.R., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977).
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plicit contract, courts find implicit ones. In C.M. v. C.C., 139 a New
Jersey court declared the sperm donor to be the child's father because of
the donor's "consent and active participation" in the insemination pro-
cess, which the court thought evinced the intent to "assume the responsi-
bilities of parenthood."' 140 In Jhordan C. v. Mary K.,14 1 although the
Court explicitly failed to reach the question of whether an oral or written
non-paternity agreement between the parties would be binding,
142 it
nonetheless emphasized that the parties' conduct during the pregnancy
and three months after the birth did not evince an intent to exclude the
biological father. 143 Hence, the court declared the biological father to be
the legal father. 44 In In re R.C.,145 the Colorado Supreme Court, after
reviewing cases and legal commentary, held that whether the sperm do-
nor should receive parental status depended on whether the sperm donor
and mother at the time of insemination agreed that the sperm donor will
be the natural father."'146
Courts are more split on the role of intent when the party claiming
parenthood is not biologically related to the child and did not carry the
child to term. In Nancy S. v. Michele G., a California court rejected the
visitation claim of a non-child bearing woman who had, together with
her partner, decided to have and rear two children. 147 The partner was
listed on each child's birth certificate as the father, lived with and helped
raise the children for several years, and shared custody of the children for
a time after the couple split. 148 The court held that "[a]lthough the facts
. .. [were] relatively straightforward regarding the intent of the natural
mother to create a parental relationship between [the non-biological
mother] and her children," using intent as a standard would depend too
much on "elusive factual determinations."' 14 9 In contrast, Massachu-
139 377 A.2d at 821.
140 See id. at 824-25.
141 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
142 Id. at 396.
143 See id. (operating from a presumption that the biological father should be the father,
but that presumption could be overcome by evidence that the parties' intent was that he not be
the father).
144 See id. at 398.
145 See In re R.C., 775 P.2d at 27.
146 Id. at 35. In one case in which a court did not rely on preconception intent when it
granted paternal rights to a sperm donor, the court looked to the post-birth relationship that had
developed between the child and the sperm donor. In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d
356, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The court looked to the functional agreement between the
biological mother and the biological father which indicated mutual intent to have the biologi-
cal father assume a paternal role. Their behavior post-birth modified or trumped whatever the
court may have been able to glean about pre-conception intent. See id.
147 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
148 Id. at 214.
149 Id. at 219.
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setts °50 and Pennsylvania 51 courts relied extensively on a co-parenting
agreement executed by a lesbian couple. Preconception intent is critical
to courts' allocations of parental rights. 152 In In re Karin T. v. Michael
T.,53 the court held that a woman who had changed her identity to be-
come a man and participated in a marriage ceremony with a woman was
responsible for the children born to the marriage through artificial insem-
ination. 154 The parties had signed an agreement in which the man agreed
that the children were "his own legitimate ... children." 155 The court
held that "[t]he contract and the equitable estoppel which prevail in this
case prevent the respondent from asserting her lack of responsibility by
reason of lack of parenthood."' 156
In her book, Defining the Family: Law, Technology and Reproduc-
tion in an Uneasy Age, Janet Dolgin argues that in relying on intent in
reproductive technology cases, courts have not been relying on con-
tract. 157 She theorizes that courts are wary of relying on contract in this
area because contract principles invoke the rules of the marketplace, and
courts resist applying those rules to the family. 158 Had they been willing
to rely on contract, she opines, they would have simply looked to the
documents and not struggled to discern intent. 159 In short, she argues
that the opinions use a subjective, not an objective, theory of contract and
thus cannot accurately be described as relying on contract. 160 Although
150 See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Mass. 1999). A recent decision in
Massachusetts refused to honor an implied contract to co-parent a child, but the couple had
split before the child was born, so the court found that imposing an obligation would force the
partner to become a parent against her will. T.F. v. B.L. Mass. No. 09104 (Aug. 25, 2004).
151 See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Super 1996) (relying on a document
that recited the biological mother and her partner's joint decision to conceive and raise a
child).
152 Also important is the distinction between visitation rights and a finding of paternity.
Lesbian and gay male partners often do not seek an adjudication of paternity or maternity; they
seek custody or visitation rights under something like a de facto parenthood theory. See
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d at 888. Courts may be more comfortable granting custody
rights as opposed to parental status to a non-biologically related person, but it is not clear that
there is an important substantive difference between an award of custody and a determination
of parenthood. Legal custody gives one the right to make decisions on behalf of the child. See
ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 613. Those decisions may be challenged in court by an-
other person with custody rights. The right to custody is best understood as the right to parent,
albeit with some interference from other parents. See id.
153 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985).
154 See id. at 784.
155 See id. at 782.
156 Id.
157 JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND REPRODUCTION IN
AN UNEASY AGE 180-81 (1997).
158 Id. at 178-82.
159 Id. at 182.
160 Id. For more on the difference between objective and subjective theories of contract
interpretation, see 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 192-96 (2d ed.
1998).
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Dolgin's assessment of the courts' discomfort with these cases is cer-
tainly sound, she dismisses the importance of contract too readily. Con-
tracting for parental rights outside of the construct of marriage is a novel,
difficult, and weighty proposition. There are, after all, very important
third parties involved.
The idea that courts would use simple objective theories of contract
interpretation when children's existence and ultimate care are at stake is
rather simplistic. "Objective" interpretations depend on context.
"[S]ubjective intent.., is relevant... insofar as it helps a court ascertain
the 'objective' meaning of certain terms."' 16 The meaning attached to
words and actions is a function of norms and conventions. 162 Words and
actions serve as manifestation of intent only when there is a commonly
understood convention that gives those words and actions meaning. The
sheer novelty of contracts in the reproductive technology area makes it
likely that courts will need to struggle with objective interpretation.
There are no commonly understood conventions. In addition, the courts'
and the parties' lack of familiarity with the technology make it important
for courts to scrutinize the contracts particularly carefully. Finally, and
possibly most importantly, the parties to these contracts are contracting
into and out of a status that enjoys significant constitutional protec-
tion. 163 It is implausible and arguably inappropriate to think that at this
nascent stage of technological baby-making, a court would enforce a sur-
rogacy contract with the facility and efficiency with which it enforces a
contract for the sale of widgets. The norms pursuant to which people act
in this arena are still emerging, and so courts must be particularly careful
in assessing what words and actions will have what legal meaning. This
does not mean that courts are not using contract. It means they are using
contract carefully.
161 Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 304 (1986).
162 See id. at 303.
163 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down compulsory high school
education law because it violated parents' ability to raise their children in the Amish tradition);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding the compulsory public school
attendance law violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it unreasonably interfered with
parents' right to direct children's upbringing and education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 401-03 (1923) (holding a state law prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language violated
the Fourteenth Amendment because it unreasonably interfered with parents' rights to educate
their children as they wished). Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944) (reifying
a parent's right to "bring up [a] child in the way he should go, which for appellant means to
teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith" but holding a statute that prohibits minors




C. DE FACTO AND EQUITABLE FATHERS: PARENTHOOD BY IMPLICIT
CONTRACT
The final class of cases in which courts rely on contract theory in-
volve de facto and/or equitable fathers. As mentioned earlier, a growing
number of courts are holding non-biologically related men responsible
for the support of children for whom they have been functioning as fa-
thers. 164 Courts also allow non-biologically related men to claim paren-
tal rights with regard to children for whom they have been functioning as
a father. 165 In both situations, the courts estop one party from claiming a
lack of paternity based on biology alone. Various different theories un-
derlie these findings of estoppel, but they all involve notions of bargain
or reliance. That is, they all involve notions of contract. Those courts
using a theory of implied or express bargain emphasize the consideration
the putative father has received by acting as father. Those courts using a
theory of express 166 or implied 167 promise emphasize reliance.
In Clevenger v. Clevenger, a California court ruled that an express
oral agreement to support a child was enough to hold a non-biologically
related man responsible as father. 168 In Wade v. Wade, a Florida court
looked to a former husband's behavior, holding himself out as the father,
claiming the son as a dependent, signing the birth certificate, as well as
"the benefits of his representation as the child's father, including the
164 See Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75 (Md. 2000); Monmouth County Div. of Soc.
Servs. v. R.K., 757 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); supra notes 67-73 and accompa-
nying text.
165 In re Marriage of Roberts, 649 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (I11. App. Ct. 1995) (holding bio-
logical mother estopped from denying husband's paternity of the child when she represented to
him that he was the father and, relying on that representation, he developed a relationship with
the child); Tregoning v. Wiltschek, 782 A.2d 1001 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding mother
estopped from denying paternal status of man who had acted as father and, correspondingly,
bloods tests not required).
166 See Nygard v. Nygard, 401 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding man
who married pregnant woman knowing that he was not the biological father and had promised
to raise child as his own estopped from denying child support).
167 See Markov, 758 A.2d at 81-83 (holding man's eleven year relationship with biologi-
cally unrelated children, during which he continually insisted on treating and raising the chil-
dren as his own, established reliance sufficient to estop man from denying responsibility as
long as wife could prove biological father could not be located); Monmouth County Div. of
Soc. Servs., 757 A.2d at 332 (holding that man who never married mother but acted as "psy-
chological parent" to biologically unrelated children was estopped from denying paternity).
168 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (holding that if a husband publicly represented
that he was the natural father of illegitimate child, accepted the child into his family, and
treated the child as his own, the husband would be estopped from asserting the illegitimacy of
the child to avoid child support). The court did not indicate whether a mistake of fact that the
man presumed he was the biological father would void the contract. Id. See also Peitros v.
Peitros, 638 A.2d 545, 548 (R.I. 1994) (holding that man was liable for support based on his
"voluntary and continuous course of conduct as the child's only father" and the fact that the
mother's choice to not terminate the pregnancy was a "direct result of [the man's] assurances
that he would assume the parental role").
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child's love and affection, his status as father . . . and the community's
recognition of him as the father" to estop the former husband from deny-
ing paternity.169 In another case involving a man trying to repudiate his
paternity, a Pennsylvania court emphasized that "the dispositive issue
should be whether the putative father has indicated by his conduct that
the child is his own."' 170 Because the putative father had indicated he
was the child's natural father, he was estopped from denying his pater-
nity, notwithstanding the putative father's allegation that he had acted
under mistake of fact that he was child's natural father. 171
Biological mothers can also be estopped from denying parental
rights to men who have acted as fathers. Under both the equitable parent
and de facto parent doctrines, a growing number of states recognize
rights in non-biologically related men who have acted as fathers.' 72 The
courts recognize these rights at the men's request. If these men did not
find benefit in the parental relationship, they would not make claims for
custody.
All of these cases involve courts finding that the benefits a man
receives by functioning as father confer rights and obligations that cannot
be abandoned upon demand. The obligations follow the benefits because
his behavior constitutes "conduct that would lead a reasonable person in
the [mother's] position to infer a promise in return for performance or
promise. '"173 The mother can count on his continued support because she
allowed him to enjoy the benefits of fatherhood. He can count on his
continued ability to receive the benefits of fatherhood because he met the
obligations of fatherhood.
Recently, courts have focused more on reliance and less on the puta-
tive father's benefit. Sometimes courts talk about the reliance of the
child, 174 sometimes they talk about the reliance of both the child and the
169 Wade v. Wade, 536 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
170 Commonwealth ex rel. Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416, 418 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
171 See id. at 419.
172 See In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1995) (wife equitably
estopped from denying that husband was father of child born during marriage where wife
concealed from husband that child was not husband's natural daughter and husband developed
emotional ties with child and acknowledged her to world as his daughter); In re Marriage of
Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (holding mother estopped from denying husband's
paternity even though both spouses knew the child was not biologically related to the hus-
band); Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Super Ct. 1998) (allowing mother's ex-husband,
who was biologically unrelated to child but lived with child for a year and acted as father, to
seek custody when couple separated). The ALl Principles incorporate both the equitable par-
ent and the de facto doctrines into the Principles' parental rights section. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 2.03(b)-(c) (2002).
173 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 160, at 235.
174 See C.C.A. v. J.M.A., 744 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding the
former husband was equitably estopped from denying paternity because the child was induced
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mother,1 75 and sometimes they talk only about the reliance of the
mother.' 76 This confusion about who must rely is understandable and
ultimately unimportant. To separate a child's reliance from that of his
acknowledged parent (i.e., the mother) makes no sense. Unless one op-
erates at the extremes of wealth, if a parent is hurt financially-as any
parent would be if a source of support disappeared-the child will also
be hurt. The child is in no position to rely financially because the child
does not make financial decisions. To the extent that courts feel the need
to find financial reliance, 177 they inevitably will look to reliance of the
acknowledged parent, not just the child. When they find that reliance,
they estop the putative father from disclaiming his support. This trend
towards reliance suggests that courts are switching contract doctrines and
relying more on notions of promissory estoppel than mutual assent. The
nature of the relationship and/or the longevity of the period of support
readily support findings that the mother "rel[ied] on the promise" and the
putative father "had reason to expect the reliance that occurred."' 178
Whether they use theories of mutual assent or promissory estoppel,
courts are looking to the functional relationship between two adults to
determine parenthood. By examining that functional relationship they
may find intent, consideration, and reliance.
to believe the former husband was his father, thereby preventing the child from knowing the
biological father or receiving support from that man even though the child was only two years
old); In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 496 (Mass. 2001) ("Cheryl knew and relied on
[the man who had been supporting her] as her father."); Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Servs.
v. R.K., 757 A.2d 319, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) ("[The child] has been financially
reliant upon [man who had been supporting her]."); Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910-11
(Vt. 1998) (holding man was estopped from denying paternity because financial and emotional
welfare of the child who depended on man for 14 years trumped fact that man and child were
not biologically related).
175 See Wright v. Newman, 467 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. 1996) (holding that a man who for
10 years acted as father to child was estopped from denying paternity where both mother and
child "relied upon [man's] promise to their detriment"); Monmouth County Div. ofSoc. Servs.,
757 A.2d at 330 ("[I]t is clear that both [mother] and [child] have relied upon, and continue to
rely upon, [the former boyfriend's] financial support. Moreover, [the child] relies upon [the
former boyfriend's] emotional support.").
176 See Perkins v. Perkins, 383 A.2d 634, 634, 636 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (holding a
man, who was "for all intents and purposes the father of the child" for over 2 years, estopped
from denying obligation to support child where mother relied on man's commitment); Markov,
758 A.2d at 83 ("[I]t is incumbent upon Appellee ... to prove sufficiently that her reliance
upon Appellant's prior conduct and verbal representations has resulted in a ... loss.").
177 Several courts have been reluctant to estop a man from repudiating paternity based
only on the emotional reliance of the child. See Markov, 758 A.2d at 83; K.B. v. D.B., 639
N.E.2d 725 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (holding mother's husband was not estopped from raising
defense of non-paternity in mother's action for child support where he had taken on role of
seven-year-old child's father despite his doubts of child's paternity and inability to persuade
mother to have an abortion).
178 See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 160, at 154-70 (explaining reliance as a ground for
recovery under the promissory estoppel doctrine).
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Before leaving the discussion of parenthood by implicit contract, it
is also worth noting that, perhaps unwittingly, the Supreme Court's doc-
trine of paternal rights is remarkably consistent with contract theory.
The string of Supreme Court cases dealing with claims of unwed fathers
that starts with Stanley v. Illinois179 and ends with Michael H. v. Gerald
D. 180 suggests that the most important factor in determining whether a
genetic father will be entitled to constitutional protection of his parental
rights is his relationship with the mother. In Stanley and Caban v. Mo-
hammed,181 cases in which the court protected the father's constitutional
rights as a parent, one could readily find an implicit agreement between
the mother and father to share parental rights. Mr. Stanley had lived with
the mother of his children intermittently for 18 years. 182 Mr. Caban lived
with his two children (and their mother) for four and two years, respec-
tively. After leaving the mother, he consistently visited the children. 183
In contrast, in Lehr v. Robertson184 and Quilloin v. Walcott,185 the Court
denied both biological fathers parental rights because neither had main-
tained a relationship with the mother of the children. Justice Stewart's
dissent in Caban was quoted with approval by Justice Stevens in Lehr:
"Even if it be assumed that each married parent after
divorce has some substantive due process right to main-
tain his or her parental relationship, it by no means fol-
lows that each unwed parent has any such right. Parental
rights do not spring full-blown from the biological con-
nection between parent and child. They require relation-
ships more enduring." 86
Justice Stewart's reference to marital status makes clear that the en-
during relationships from which paternal rights grow are relationships
with the mother, not just the child. 187 When the biological father's rela-
tionship with the mother is strong enough, and, more particularly, when
the mother manifests her intent and desire for the biological father to
assume the role of father, he receives constitutional protection for his
179 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
180 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
181 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
182 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
183 Caban, 441 U.S. at 384.
184 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
185 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
186 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added, citations and
italics omitted)).
187 The situation in Lehr is all the more significant because the uncontested facts revealed
that the mother actively prevented the biological father from developing such a relationship.
She did not agree to him being the father of the child, and because of the greater control she
had over the child at birth, her desires trumped. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White J., dissenting).
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paternal rights.' 88 If the mother has not entered into a relationship with
the biological father with regard to parenting the child or if she has
clearly committed to parenting with someone else,' 89 biology alone will
not grant fathers constitutional protection.
D. PARENTHOOD AS LIVED: CONTRACTS IN PRACTICE
The law's comfort in letting contract, not biology, confer parental
status may be partially explained by parents' willingness to let contract
determine parental status. Agreement or patterned behavior between bio-
logical mothers and fathers is the most important predictor of paternal
support. Marital status is more important than race, education, age, and
family size in predicting the likelihood of a child support award. 190 In
one of the most comprehensive studies of child support in this country,
Andrew Belier and John Graham found that only 16% of never-married
mothers received child support awards. 191 Close to half (43%) of never-
married mothers who did not receive an award said they did not want
one, which suggests that mothers themselves do not see biology as the
lynchpin of male responsibility. 92
The great majority of women who want a child support payment,
and therefore sue for paternity, pursue men with whom they have had a
relationship of some duration. Two-thirds of paternity suits involve wo-
men suing men who were present at the birth of the child. 193 Eighty
percent of unwed fathers support mothers during the pregnancy. 194 At
188 For further explication of this theory, see Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial As-
sumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REv. 637 (1993) (arguing that the more the biolog-
ical father and mother's relationship resembles the stereotypical nuclear family, the more
likely the court is to acknowledge paternal rights).
189 See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding the biological connection plus a paren-
tal relationship with the child was not enough to secure constitutional protection for the biolog-
ical father where the mother was married to someone other than the biological father at time of
child's birth and where both mother and her husband wished to maintain the husband's legal
status as father).
190 See ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT 89 tbl. 4.2 (1993).
191 Id. at 20 tbl. 2.1.
192 Id. at 21. This suggests that the recent improvements in DNA matching have had and
will have minimal impact on the likelihood of women filing for paternity. In 1986, only 3% of
mothers without a child support award cited an inability to establish paternity as a reason that
they were not receiving child support. Id. at 20. A comparably large (42%) percentage of
ever-divorced mothers without an award said they did not want an award. Id. Many of the
ever-divorced women had remarried and thus had an alternative source of support, but that
simply underscores the conclusion that a substantial percentage of both never-married and
divorced do not see biology as the lynchpin of male responsibility.
193 Esther Wattenberg, Paternity Actions and Young Fathers, in YOUNG UNWED FATHERS:
CHANGING ROLES AND EMERGING POLICIES 213, 226 (Robert I. Lerman & Theodora J. Ooms
eds., 1993).
194 Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, The Fragile Families and Child Well-Being
Study: Questions, Design and a Few Preliminary Results 41 (Institute for Research on Poverty
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the time of the child's birth, 80% of unwed parents are romantically in-
volved, and 50% live together.195 Approximately 85% of unmarried fa-
thers continue their relationship with a teenage mother through the
pregnancy and for an average of two to three years into the child's
life. 196 Thus, the vast majority of women who get child support from
unmarried fathers have claims rooted in relationship as well as blood.
The most important factor in predicting continued contact between a
separated father and his children is the father's relationship with the chil-
dren's mother.197 Significantly, his relationship with the mother is more
important than the extent of his involvement with the children prior to
separation. 198 Interviews also suggest that men's subjective sense of re-
sponsibility toward their children is linked more to their feelings toward
the mother than their feelings toward their children. 199 One of the most
transparent manifestations of this phenomenon is men's tendency to sup-
port and nurture the children with whom they live more than children to
whom they are biologically related.200 Fathers who, for whatever reason,
can no longer cooperate with a former partner, often find a new one. It is
the children of that new partner whom they support both financially and
emotionally. 20 Thus, when the parenting agreement with the first wo-
man breaks down, they make a new agreement with a new woman and
they support that new woman's children.
There are also significant groups of people, particularly low-income
people, for whom parenting apart has become the norm.a0 2 In these
groups, researchers have found that parental status is "negotiated" as
couples engage in a short period of bargaining following pregnancy, end-
ing in a resolution of whether to abort or keep the child.20 3 After the
Discussion Paper no. 1208-00), available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WPOO-
07-McLanahan.pdf.
195 Id.
196 Victoria Schwartz Williams & Robert G. Williams, Identifying Daddy: The Role of the
Courts in Establishing Paternity, 28 JUDGES' J. No. 3, at 5 (1989).
197 DOWD, supra note 79, at 3. Initial reports from the Fragile Families Project at
Princeton University indicates that while in a relationship with the father, unwed mothers are
more supportive of fathers' rights than are wed mothers. Once the romantic relationship has
ended, however, they are substantially less likely to be supportive of his rights. Lin & McLan-
ahan, supra note 99, at 16.
198 DowD, supra note 79, at 3.
199 See WILLIAM MARSIGLIO, PROCREATIVE MAN 95 (1998) (citing FRANK F. FUR-
STENBERG JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN
PARENTS PART (1991)).
200 See DowD, supra note 79, at 26-31, 204 (elaborating on the pattern of "serial
parenting").
201 Id.
202 Frank F. Furstenberg Jr., Fathering in the Inner City: Paternal Participation and Pub-
lic Policy, in FATHERHOOD: CONTEMPORARY THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL POLICY 119,
119 (William Marsiglio ed., 1995).
203 Id. at 131.
Vol. 14:1
BARGAINING OR BIOLOGY?
initial negotiation, however, the original father often cedes responsibility
to a mother's new partner or to another man who is "doing more" for the
child.204 Mothers, fathers, and children in these communities agree that
"doing for" a child should be the mark of fatherhood. 20 5 Failure to "do
for" may cause a man to lose his social status as father.206 Again, when
the original parenting agreement breaks down, mothers make another
one.
Judges are also aware of the importance of the mother-father rela-
tionship. Despite Congress' attempt to eliminate the distinction between
marital and non-marital children, judges award substantially more child
support to women who were married to the father than to women who
were not. After correcting for education, age, race, region, and the num-
ber and ages of children, Belier and Graham still found an average award
of $786 less for unmarried women. 207 The unmarried biological father's
likely lower income level may account for much of this unexplained dif-
ferential, but Beller and Graham estimated that the income difference
could at most account for 73% of the award amount differential. 20 8 In
other words, unmarried women get less child support simply because
they are not married. This suggests that the judges awarding the support
view the marital agreement as a critical part of determining the extent of
the biological father's responsibility.
In sum, as a matter of subjective expectation between the parties,
how children actually experience who their parents are, and how judges
award child support, implicit or explicit private agreements between
adults play a critical role in determining the extent of paternal responsi-
bility. This is not to say that private agreement or contract explains all
allocations of parental status. The increased paternal identification re-
quirements passed as part of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act20 9 un-
abashedly adopt blood over contract as the sin quo non of parenthood.
By most accounts, these measures have increased the amount of child
support paid by men.210 Moreover, as discussed in Section I, some
204 See id. at 139
205 Id. at 123-124.
206 Id. at 129.
207 BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 190, at I11.
208 Id.
209 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
210 It is still not clear, however, that the amount of support collected exceeds the enforce-
ment costs. Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 461, 475-76. Nor is it at all clear that making these men involved in their biological
children's lives is good for the children. Unwed mothers who are not romantically involved
with the biological father have substantially higher opposition to fathers' involvement than do
either unwed mothers who are romantically involved with the father or never-married mothers.
Lin & McLanahan, supra note 99, at 16. Studies indicate that the cost on the child of friction
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courts refuse to honor the intent of the biological parents particularly if
the intent was to relieve the biological father of obligation. 21' My argu-
ment is not that contract or intent always governs, but that contract gov-
erns much more than the letter of paternity law would suggest.
III. THE CONTRACT
The last section examined how law and real life already let princi-
ples from contract determine parental status. It was, for the most part,
descriptive. This section moves into the normative in order to explore
and justify in more detail the nature of the contractual relationship. The
first part of this section looks at contract formation and examines how a
parental status contract can be made under a reliance theory, will theory,
bargain theory, or relational theory of contract. The second and third
parts of this section look more closely at the terms of the contract. Part
Two analyzes the entitlement that is bargained for and Part Three ana-
lyzes the scope of the contractual obligation incurred. The rules explored
in the latter parts of this Section are presented in the spirit of an offer of
examples of the ways in which a contract regime might operate. I do not
mean to suggest that the rules presented here are absolute or essential. I
invite counter-offers.
A. CONTRACT THEORY
There are many theories of contract and it may well be impossible
to explain all contractual relations with one model. 2 12 Without going
into any one theory in too much detail, this part will sketch how reliance
and will theory, bargain theory and relational contract theory all support
the idea that parental status can arise from implicit or explicit agreements
to share parental rights and obligations. 213
1. Reliance and Will Theory
Reliance and will theory-both stalwarts of contract interpreta-
tion-are party-based theories of contract formation. 214 The primary
between unmarried parents may be greater than the benefit gained from increased resources
supplied by the noncustodial parent. See McLanahan et al., supra note 95.
211 See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); In re A.B. v.
P.B., 444 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
212 See generally P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q.
REv. 193, 195 (P. V. Baker ed. 1978).
213 This section will not discuss efficiency theory because it is particularly unlikely that
one would see economic efficiency as the goal of family law. "Efficiency notions alone ...
cannot completely explain why certain commitments should be enforced unless it is... shown
that economic efficiency is the exclusive goal of a legal order." Barnett, supra note 161, at
283.
214 See id. at 271-72.
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concern of both theories centers on the contracting parties; reliance theo-
ries primarily protect the promisee, while will theories primarily protect
the promisor. 215 Either theory can explain why the law should enforce a
parental status contract. It is easy to justify parental contracts under a
reliance theory because in most cases it is easy to find reliance on the
part of the mother and/or child. The only question, then, is whether the
reliance is reasonable. A mother's reliance on a man's explicit promise
"to treat the baby as his own" 216 hardly seems unreasonable, particularly
in light of a long history of letting the connection between husband and
wife determine the parenthood of the child.2 17 Relying on an implicit
promise to support, although potentially more ambiguous, is also un-
likely to be unreasonable. The implicit promise will only be found when
the relationship between the promisor and the mother is obvious and in-
terdependent enough for the law to assume a promise. By the same to-
ken, the longer and more enmeshed the relationship, the more likely that
reliance on the relationship is reasonable. Thus, if one can find the im-
plicit promise, one can probably find reasonable reliance.
Will theories are concerned with the promisor.218 In particular, will
theories surmise that a contract has not formed unless the terms of that
contract reflect the promisor's will. Will theory suffers from the subjec-
tive/objective problem discussed earlier. 219 If the promisor's subjective
will contradicts an objective interpretation of his words or actions, will
theory founders in its struggle to give words meaning. As a result, will
theories inevitably bend to other interests, like reliance or fairness.
220
Nonetheless, will theory cannot be dismissed entirely because it gives
moral force to the notion that a promisor must be held to his promises.
Holding a promisor accountable honors the promisor's autonomy which
he exercises in the contract by manifesting his will. Thus, the question
from will theory in the parental contract context is whether imposing
parental status on a provider because of his explicit or implicit agreement
respects his autonomy.
One's response to this query probably depends on how one views
the interdependency of family groups. If one sees all parties in a family
as independent beings, as some have argued the law increasingly con-
strues them, 221 then respecting autonomy might mean not binding a man
215 See id.
216 Nygard v. Nygard, 401 N.W.2d 323, 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). See also In re Karin
T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1985).
217 See supra Section II.A.
218 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TION (1981); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553 (1933).
219 See supra notes 161-163.
220 Barnett, supra note 161, at 273-74.
221 See Dolgin, supra note 188.
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who has become a part of a family unit precisely because he is, at core,
independent. He should be viewed by the parties and the law as an au-
tonomous individual, free to exercise his own will at any time. He
should, for instance, be able to say "I intended to have a relationship with
the mother, but not the child(ren)." The law need not presume any other
intention. On the other hand, if one sees parties in family units, even
nontraditional family units, as essentially interdependent, then a man's
claim that his autonomy interest trumps the needs of the interdependency
seems remarkably feeble. Unless a man explicitly claims "I intend to
have a relationship with you [the mother], but not your child(ren)," it
may make more sense to assume that he is willingly undertaking respon-
sibility for the children because he is willingly interjecting himself into
an obviously interdependent unit. The foreseeability of the harm caused
to everyone by his withdrawal from the unit will be transparent. 222 By
becoming part of a family unit, a man (or woman) foreseeably chooses to
subordinate his autonomy interest. 223 Under a will theory, one can hold
a man responsible as a father if he has acted like a father because it is
simply unreasonable for him to proclaim that his subjective intent was to
be a "father-for-a-time," with that time ending whenever he walks away.
Family members form bonds and create dependencies that must be met
on an on-going basis. 224
2. Bargain Theory
The bargain theory of consideration, probably the best known and
most widely used theory of contract, posits that a contract is a contract
and not an unenforceable agreement when consideration is bargained for
by and passes from both sides. Bargain theory focuses less on the parties
and more on the process of contract formation. To find a bargain con-
tract in the parental status context one needs to find bilateral considera-
tion passing from both sides. This is not hard. The mother offers to let
her partner share in the parenting of her child(ren). The father accepts by
participating financially and emotionally. The mother relinquishes some
222 A sports analogy comes to mind. A point guard on a basketball team cannot claim
that she is responsible only to the center for damages incurred when she left the team. Even if
the only person with whom the point guard intended to have a relationship was the center, the
obvious foreseeability of the damage that her departure would cause to the rest of the team
should make her responsible to the other players as well. For a discussion of what courts
generally do when parties to a contract fail to include terms to cover foreseeable problems, see
2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 327-38 (2d ed., 1998).
223 The recent ALI Principles suggest that the same kind of thinking should govern the
law of cohabitation. Unless the cohabiters specifically contract out of the law or marital disso-
lution, the law of marital dissolution should govern their break-up. See AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
rurE, supra note 172, at § 6.02 cmt. a, 915.




of her parental rights to receive emotional and financial support. The
father incurs obligations for financial support in order to participate emo-
tionally in the life of the family. He gains the benefits of parenthood.
She loses control that she would otherwise have to steer the upbringing
of the child. 225 The father figure cannot be heard to say that there are no
benefits because all of the petitions for rights and visitation made by non-
biologically related functional parents attest to the fact that functional
fathers receive consideration.22 6 Thus, there is bilateral consideration
and a contract.
3. Relational Contract Theory
Relational contract theory looks to relationships between parties to
find the existence and terms of a contract. 227 Ian Macneil suggests that
whenever an ongoing relationship between the parties is likely to be
more important than a discrete transaction or communication between
the parties, the law should look to the relationship itself rather than to
specific terms or the lack thereof. As Charles Goetz and Robert Scott put
it, "[a] contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of
reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obliga-
tions. '228 With relational contracts, the "existence of formal communi-
cations does not automatically trigger application of [ ] neoclassical"
contract interpretation. 229 "Rather, a preliminary question must always
be asked: do the formal communications indeed reflect the sharp past
focus and strong intentions necessary to put these communications high
in the priorities of values created by the contractual relation?" 230 If the
written agreement looks obviously different than the lived relationship,
then the written agreement will have limited importance. In such a case
one would look to the relationship itself to find terms.
The recent Family Law ALl guidelines for custody suggest a com-
parable approach to determining the terms of a post-divorce custody
award. Instead of relying on abstract concepts like joint custody, best
225 For more on what these rights involve, see infra text accompanying notes 224-227.
The reason why parental rights are vested in the mother in the first instance is explored infra in
Section III.B.
226 See equitable parent cases discussed supra Section II.C.
227 See generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Rela-
tions Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854
(1978). Relational contract theory dispenses with much of the theoretical purity and formality
of the previously addressed theories. Instead of looking to what is explicitly presented, or in
Ian Macneil's phrase, "presentiated," in a formal contract, relational contract theory examines
how people act and what they come to expect. See id.
228 Charles . Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REv. 1089, 1091 (1981).
229 Macneil, supra note 227, at 894.
230 Id.
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interest of the child, or tender years presumptions, the ALI argues that
courts should use the past relationship to determine future rights and
obligations. 23'
In many ways, the ALl rules adopt suggestions made by Robert and
Elizabeth Scott in a piece that explored the benefits of viewing marriage
as a relational contract.232 Among other suggestions in that piece, the
Scotts argue that relational contract theory can help determine optimal
custody and support rules for divorce. 233 I am arguing that relational
contract theory is just as good at helping courts determine custody and
support issues even if the parties were never married and even if they are
not biologically related to the children. In other words, relational con-
tract theory is just as good at determining parental status as it is at deter-
mining custody rights. The relationships of unmarried parents or married
people whose children are not necessarily their biological issue do not
differ in material ways from the relationships of married people whose
children are their biological issue. The interdependency and exchange
and reliance are often identical. Once one acknowledges that legally en-
forceable rights and obligations can come from the relationship itself, not
only from some formal legal agreement, then it is not hard to find paren-
tal rights and obligations bestowed by virtue of the relationship. Once
one finds parental rights and obligations bestowed by virtue of relation-
ship, one finds parental rights and obligations bestowed by virtue of im-
plied contract. If parental rights and obligations are bestowed by virtue
of contract, parental status is bestowed by virtue of contract.
The next part explores the terms of the contract in more detail. My
claim is that contract theory and doctrine provide a superior framework
for determining parental status than does the current regime. My claim is
not that all agreements to parent are legally enforceable contracts. The
relationship between mother and father, at least if it is significant enough
to give rise to parental status, is likely to be complex and messy and
subjective; it is not likely to conform to the classical model of con-
tract. 234 However, as most contract scholars agree, there are precious
231 See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrTUTE, supra note 172, at § 2.08(1) ("Unless otherwise re-
solved by agreement of the parents ... the court should allocate custodial responsibility so that
the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion
of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents'
separation ....").
232 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L.
REv. 1225, 1306 (1998) ("[T]he substantive legal rules defining the conditions for divorce,
alimony, spousal support, and, to a lesser extent, child custody, are usefully analyzed as con-
tract default rules.").
233 See id. at 1323.
234 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 805, 805 (2000) ("Classical contract law was marked by several characteristics. It was
axiomatic and deductive. It was objective and standardized. It was static. It was implicitly
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few arrangements, commercial or otherwise, that conform to the classical
model of contract. 235 "All contracts are relational, complex and subjec-
tive. '236 The debate between current contract scholars is not about
whether contracts are discrete willful acts with defined objective terms
(almost none of them are), but about the role contract law should play in
adjudicating contractual disputes involving complicated relationships,
modified terms, and irrational behavior.237 There are those who want to
expand contract law to better incorporate all of the bargaining relation-
ships that do not conform to the classical model. 238 There are others who
suggest that we are better off restricting judges to their traditional role as
formalistic interpreters of objective terms because judges are quite inca-
pable of incorporating adequately or fairly the variety of norms and sub-
jective understandings that permeate most contractual relationships. 239
The model offered here is consistent with either an expansive or a re-
stricted understanding of contract interpretation. The rules we choose to
apply to agreements between people who act like parents may be a func-
tion solely of private agreement, public policy, or some combination of
the two. 240 An expansionist might look to a vast array of norms, rela-
tionships, and policy concerns to interpret the contract between mother
and father. A formalist might make all necessary policy determinations
ex ante and impose legislatively mandated boilerplate for many or most
parental status contracts.241 Whichever rules we choose to apply, con-
tract doctrine can be used "as a structure of argument. 242
based on a paradigm of bargains made between strangers transacting on a perfect market. It
was based on a rational-actor model of psychology.").
235 See id.
236 Robert E. Scott, The Case of Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
847, 852 (2000).
237 See id. at 852-53.
238 See Eisenberg, supra note 234; MacNeil, supra note 227.
239 See generally Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical
Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 749, 754 (2000); Scott, supra note 236, at 874. Scott
argues that if we are worried about the opportunistic behavior in a formalist regime, legisla-
tively mandated boilerplate can protect inexperienced parties to the contract. Id. at 874. Eric
Posner would probably also be an example of someone who would favor a minimal role for
judges in contract interpretation. See Posner, supra.
240 Landlord-tenant law is a good example of a field in which contract principles blend
with historical property doctrine and legislative mandate such that courts interpret rights and
obligations based on a mixture of private agreement, public policy, and traditional status
relationships.
241 See Scott, supra note 236, at 874. Scott gives the example of the disclaimer of war-
ranty language required by the UCC as an example of legislatively mandated boilerplate. Leg-
islatively mandated boilerplate in this context might involve requirements that a man who
lived with a child for a given period of time necessarily assume some financial responsibility
for that child, regardless of the intent of the parties. See id.
242 See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 737,
748 (2000). Ira Ellman argues that "contract thinking" is a wholly inadequate mechanism for
viewing most familial obligations. See Ellman, supra note 118, at 1375-77. Ellman argues
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B. THE ENTITLEMENT AT ISSUE
Before one can accept the idea that parental obligations can arise
from contract, one must accept the idea that parental status can be appro-
priately conceptualized as property, or at least an amalgam of alienable
rights and obligations. As many have noted, there is an intrinsic relation-
ship between contracts and property. 243 Contracts are vehicles for trans-
ferring property. In Randy Barnett's formulation, a contract is a
"manifestation of an intention to alienate rights."' 244 I have elsewhere
explained some of the benefits of using property paradigms in the family
law area.2 45 Among other things, property paradigms help courts resolve
competing claims to child custody in a manner that maintains family au-
tonomy and rewards those adults who have sacrificed for and invested in
the child.2 46 Nonetheless, there is a strong resistance to property rhetoric
when it comes to characterizing family relationships-particularly rela-
tionships with children. 247 It may be more palatable to think of an agree-
ment between parents not as a contract for property but as a
"manifestation of an intention to alienate rights. '2 48 Whatever formula-
tion one chooses, if one acknowledges that courts are currently using
notions of contract to guide their decisions as to parental status, then one
acknowledges that courts are currently using notions of property to deter-
that what gives rise to obligation is the relationship itself, not an abstract notion of contract.
See id. There are several responses. First, in the case of implicit contracts, there is little
difference between the relationship itself and the contract. The terms of the contract are the
relationship as it was lived. Second, the relationships that Ellman cites as creating "enforcea-
ble duties... arising from the relationship," not a contract (e.g. landlords and tenants, employ-
ers and employees, lawyers and clients) all involve relationships that also include a contractual
component. See id. In all of these cases, the contract may not define the complete obligation,
but that does not mean that the obligation could arise without the contract.
243 See Barnett, supra note 161, at 301 (explaining the interdependence of a consent the-
ory of contract and entitlements theory); Steven N. S. Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aver-
sion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J.L. & ECON. 23, 23 (1969)
("[T]ransactions conducted in the market place entail outright or partial transfers of property
rights among individual contracting parties."); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Dis-
tributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 472 (1980) (describing how contracts "provide for the
exchange of property"); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 523 (stating that "exchange relations ... presuppose some idea of
property").
244 Barnett, supra note 161, at 304.
245 See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy
by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523 (1998).
246 Id. at 1576-85.
247 See Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 49
(1997); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF
CULTURE 162, 166 (Robert Post ed. 1991); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Di-
vorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2350 (1994); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CAR-
DOZo L. REv. 1747, 1811-14 (1993).
248 Barnett, supra note 161, at 304.
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mine parental status. Therefore it is important for us to analyze the na-
ture of the property at issue. What is it that is transferred between adults
that allows courts to reach conclusions as to parental status?
1. The Origins of the Entitlement
The property at issue in the parental contract is the entitlement to
parental status. Parental status brings with it parental rights. For some,
parental rights include the rights to discipline and educate and the rights
to choose medical treatment, religious traditions, geographical location,
and social contacts for their children. 249 For others, in particular those
parents who are not married to a child's other parent, parental rights are
more limited. They are more limited because in cases of conflict be-
tween two never married or divorced parents, it is a court that decides
what is in the child's best interest. 250 Nonetheless, in those cases, paren-
tal status at least brings with it the procedural right to challenge the ways
in which a child is being reared. Parental status also brings with it a
presumptive right to spend time with the child. Even if one does not
have legal custody, states have a heavy presumption in favor of parental
visitation.25' It is that visitation that many non-biological parents fight
for when biological parents want to keep them at bay. 252
Parental status also brings with it obligations-most obviously, the
duty to support the child. At present, as described earlier, the degree of
one's obligation is not tied to the strength of one's entitlement to a rela-
tionship with the child. One's obligation is rather a simple function of
one's income-a raw percentage-and attaches absolutely and regard-
less of one's relationship with the child.
The contractual model offered here suggests that when adults con-
tract for parental status, they contract to either alienate or acquire paren-
tal status vis-A-vis a child. Parents who alienate their parental rights are
agreeing to share those rights with someone else. They are agreeing to
co-parent. They are agreeing to give someone else the procedural right
to challenge the way in which the child is being reared and to give that
person a right to petition for visitation. The co-parents who receive these
rights are agreeing to accept the rights and responsibilities (i.e., the duty
to support) of parenthood. They accept the contract because, for
whatever reason, they want to act as a parent to the child.
249 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879,
884-85 (1984).
250 See Baker, supra note 245, at 1545-48.
251 See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 684-85.
252 See supra text accompanying note 172.
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There still is a question of initial entitlement though. One can only
agree to contract away property that one has. Where do the rights come
from for those parents who have not gotten them through exchange with
another parent? One might think the answer to that question is the ge-
netic material that one's body produces. Hence, men could sell sperm
and women could sell eggs and in doing so they would alienate not only
their genetic material but the parental status that might accompany that
genetic material. If this were the case though, genetic connection per se
would give one parental status as long as one had not contracted that
status away. As we saw, such is not the case either constitutionally or as
a matter of common law. Men who are genetically connected to a child
do not necessarily enjoy the rights (or the obligations) of parenthood if
someone else is filling the parental role. 253
Instead, the property interest appears to emanate with the mother.
De facto, if not de jure, it is the gestational mother who controls whether
a biological father or any other person is able to establish a relationship
with the child and thereby secure parental rights.254 As a preliminary
matter, it is the pregnant woman and only the pregnant woman who de-
cides whether to remain pregnant. Once that decision is made, the preg-
nant woman can, with remarkable ease, prevent a biological father from
ever knowing about a child's existence. For biological parents who are
not living together, it is the woman who decides whether the biological
father knows about the pregnancy, how participatory the biological father
(or any other potential "father") can be during the pregnancy, and, at
least when the child is young, how much contact the father can have.255
She can thereby all but ensure that his parental rights will never be exer-
cised. She can also take measures to make it very likely that parental
status will be vested in someone else. She can do that by marrying
someone else, letting someone else adopt the child, or simply sharing her
life with someone else. As numerous researchers have found, women
have always determined the extent of paternal involvement with chil-
253 See supra Section I.C.
254 If the pregnant woman is married-that is, if she has previously agreed to share paren-
tal rights with someone else-she does not have as much control. See infra Section III.B.2.
255 It is extraordinarily difficult and not much fun to care for a pre or nominally verbal
child that one does not know. One takes care of such a child by anticipating and/or rapidly
understanding that child's needs. Experience with the child or excellent communication with a
person who does have that experience is the only means by which one can become comforta-
ble. Moreover, to transport a child of that age, or even to play with him or her, one needs to be
equipped, with car seats and cribs and age appropriate toys. Thus, if the primary caretaker is
resistant to sharing her relationship with the child, it is easy to see how the adult who nonethe-
less wants such a relationship is fighting an uphill battle.
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dren.256 From conception on, de facto parental status is something that
the woman has and can, at her discretion, mete out to someone else. 257
Although courts have never put it in these terms,258 the above sug-
gests that the gestational mother gains parental status through her gesta-
tional investment, not through her genetic contribution. A father gains
parental status through his relationship with the mother. If the gesta-
tional mother has not contracted her labor out (in a gestational surrogacy
contract) 259 or previously agreed (through marriage or another form of
contract) 260 to share parental rights, then she has exclusive control.
Once she agrees, either explicitly or implicitly, to share that control, she
has a co-parent.
To some, this paradigm may seem highly unfair. The woman, by
virtue of labor that a man cannot give, has more access to parenthood
than a man. Yet the very same factors that make it unfair to hold an
unwilling man liable for a child that he never wanted make it appropriate
to vest the gestational mother with sole parental status. It is her decision
to undergo the huge and very costly burdens of pregnancy. 261 Up until
birth, the mother has, of necessity, invested far more of herself than has
the biological father. Conscientious men may try to invest time and
money in the pregnancy, but the decision as to whether to accept that
effort is the mother's. At a very basic level, there is simply no compari-
son between what a mother necessarily gives during pregnancy and what
a man can give. Thus, by virtue of her sole responsibility and labor, the
256 See Judith A. Seltzer & Yvonne Brandreth, What Fathers Say About Involvement with
Children after Separation, in FATHERHOOD: CONTEMPORARY THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SO-
CIAL POLICY 166, 190 (William Marsiglio ed. 1995) ("[W]omen orchestrate men's relation-
ships with children."); supra note 99 and accompanying text.
257 This is less true for biological parents who are living together, but as long as the
woman has an exit alternative, she has a means of blocking the biological father's
involvement.
258 Lehr indicated that gestational labor was a critical factor in distinguishing between the
initial parental rights of two biological parents. "The mother carries and bears the child, and in
this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must
be gauged by other measures." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (citing
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
259 See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding husband and wife
were legal parents of child born of woman in whom couple's fertilized egg had been
implanted).
260 See generally E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (honoring co-parenting
agreement delineating lesbian couple's intention to share parental rights and obligations that
couple signed prior to the child's birth).
261 As I have previously stated, "[a] biological father gives his sperm. A gestational
mother gives: her egg (usually), her liver, her bladder, her iron supply, her pulmonary system,
her digestive system, the elasticity of her skin and often her psychological well-being." Baker,
supra note 245, at 1586. For more on the physical burdens of pregnancy, see McDonagh,
supra note 87, at 1073-74.
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mother obtains sole parental rights. It follows, then, that she should
shoulder the entire obligation.
What this paradigm suggests, quite logically, is that all pregnant
women should be treated alike. A woman who gets pregnant the old-
fashioned way should be treated just as a woman who gets pregnant by
virtue of artificial insemination. If there is a pre-existing marriage or
contract suggesting that the pregnant woman intends to share her rights
and responsibilities, the law should honor that contract and vest parental
status in a co-parent. If there is no such contract, the woman is on her
own.
262
2. Limitations on the Contract
To a certain extent, the degree to which a mother shares the rights
and responsibilities that she acquires by virtue of gestation is up to her,
but the number of people she can contract with and the extent to which
she can completely alienate her parental status must be limited. Scholars
disagree about the relative harms and benefits of multiple parental
figures in a child's life,263 but most can probably agree that there should
be some limit on the number of legal "parents" a child should have. The
more adults who have standing to assert visitation rights and challenge
the parenting decisions of others, the greater the likelihood of litigation.
As almost all family law commentators have recognized, judges are re-
markably ill-prepared and institutionally ill-suited to make sound parent-
ing decisions. 264 The more people there are with parental rights vis-A-vis
the same child, the greater the likelihood that a judge will be deciding
what is in that child's best interest. The extraordinary pecuniary and
emotional toll this can take on a child suggests that, for the child's sake,
the law should limit the number of contracts a mother can make with
regard to any one child. 265
262 As discussed infra at notes 320-25 and accompanying text, the idea of vesting mothers
with sole parental rights and responsibilities is not new. See also FINEMAN, supra note 2.
What is new is providing legal recognition to the people with whom the mother then shares
those rights and responsibilities.
263 Compare Bartlett, supra note 249 and Cahn, supra note 247 (arguing that children
benefit from continued contact with various different parental figures) with Emily Buss, "Pa-
rental" Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635 (2002) (contending that judicial (in)capacity and children's
welfare argue against too many adults having the right to challenge how a child is being
reared).
264 See Buss, supra note 263. For a discussion of the critiques of the best interest of the
child standard, see generally, Baker, supra note 245, at 1559-61.
265 1 agree with Professor Buss, supra note 263, that two is probably an optimal number
but that in certain situations, three or four might be permissible. In contrast, the ALI, by
giving parents by estoppel, de facto parents, biological parents who are not legal parents, and
legal parents standing to challenge custodial and parental decision-making plans, seems to
endorse an almost infinite number of people with parental status. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
supra note 172, at § 2.03.
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On the other hand, if a father abandons a mother and child, the
mother should be able to contract with someone else. By abandoning,
the first father loses his right to be a parent and frees the mother up to
contract with someone else. If she contracts with someone else, that new
person becomes the father with his own parental rights and obligations.
The first father stays obligated until the mother contracts with someone
else. Once she does, the first father loses rights and obligations. This is
what currently happens in the adoption context.266
The law should also limit the extent to which the mother can alien-
ate her rights. The bonding and reliance that give rise to the equitable
and de facto parenthood doctrines 267 suggest that a parent should not be
able to alienate her rights and responsibilities completely. That is, she
should not be able to sell her child. Children form bonds. In order to
protect those bonds, the law must forbid the complete alienation of a
parent's parental rights. If a parent abdicates his or her rights by aban-
doning the child, the law cannot necessarily stop him or her, but the law
can forbid a parent from getting paid to effect such an abandonment.2 68
3. Abandonment and Contractual Rights
Unfortunately, parenting studies suggest that abandonment by fa-
thers is common. Nearly forty percent of children do not live with their
266 When a custodial parent finds someone else whom she wants to adopt her child, the
state terminates the parental rights of the other parent if the latter has abandoned the child. See,
e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 50/1-9 (2003) (providing that consent of a parent is not required
if the parent has failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility
for the child's welfare").
267 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
268 One might argue that a mother should be able to sell her newborn child because the
bonds are not sufficiently developed. Prominent legal economists have previously made the
argument that such sales would promote efficiency in troubled adoption markets. See Elisa-
beth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEG. STUD.
323 (1978). Adopting the model produced in this article need not lead one to adopt the Landes
and Posner solution, however. The evidence from adoption studies suggests that complete
alienation of one's parental rights is difficult for a child, even if done at birth and particularly
if done by the mother. See DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., 38 CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT TO
ADOP'ION: DEVELOPMENTAL AND CLINICAL ISSUES (1998); Madelyn Freundlich, Adoption Re-
search: An Assessment of Empirical Contributions to the Advancement of Adoption Practice,
11 J. Soc. DISTRESS & THE HOMELESS 143, 152-53 (2002) (examining the current state of
adoption research). Although many pro-life activists might disagree, there is a strong argu-
ment to be made that we should not encourage adoption because adoption is hard on children.
In those cases in which a pregnant woman knows that she does not want or cannot handle
parenthood we can allow the complete alienation of parental rights, but only if done on a
voluntary basis. There are also policy concerns about the class effects of allowing women to
sell their newborns. Poor mothers might make a business of selling their babies to richer
parents. The law can be concerned enough about the morality of that market to forbid outright
alienation of parental rights, even for newborns. Encouraging alienations by enforcing con-
tracts for money would facilitate a market that we do not wish to encourage.
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fathers. 269 Only one in six children in fatherless households see their
father at least once a week.270 Forty percent of children who live in
fatherless households have not seen their fathers at all in the past year. 271
The chances of a child not having seen his or her father increase with
time. One study found that ten years after divorce, nearly two-thirds of
the children of those divorces had not seen their father at all in the past
year. 272 Abandonment by mothers is not unheard of, but noncustodial
mothers are much more likely than noncustodial fathers to visit their
children. 273 In other words, women abandon their children but with far
less frequency than do men.
The prevalence of abandonment by fathers suggests that a legal la-
bel of father does not keep men sufficiently connected to their children to
ensure that child support gets paid or that contact is maintained. Thus, it
is not clear we would have any fewer involved and paying fathers if the
law acknowledged such abandonment and deprived abandoning fathers
of their legal status as parents. Abandonment would also not relieve a
parent of parental status unless the other parent contracted with someone
new. A parent remains liable for the terms of the contract unless the
other parent has mitigated the damages caused by the disintegration of
the first agreement by finding another parent who explicitly or implicitly
agrees to assume parental status. 274 The proposed regime thus gives no
added incentive for fathers to abandon children.
The greater concern is probably the incentive effect on potential
new fathers. Will subsequent men form a relationship with a mother if
they know that they could become legally responsible for her children?
It is this very concern that makes some judges wary of holding steppar-
ents responsible for child support. 275 There are several responses. First,
the elasticity of men's preference curves may not be as great as the con-
cern suggests. If someone wants to share his life with a woman and her
family, the factors urging him to do so may overwhelm misgivings he
has about future liability. This is particularly likely to be true if one
assumes that the pool of women with whom he might share his life is
269 Wade F. Horn, You've Come a Long Way Daddy: After Being Pilloried and Left for
Dead, the Fatherhood Ideal Is Making a Comeback, POL'Y REV., July/August 1997, at 24, 27
(Horn's study, which showed that 40% of children live in fatherless households, was based on
pre-1990 data. He predicted that the number would be 60% in the 1990s.).
270 Id. at 30.
271 Id.
272 Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Good Dads-Bad Dads: Two Faces of Fatherhood, in THE
CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBIC POLICY 193, 203 (Andrew J. Cherlin ed., 1988).
273 JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS 160 (2000).
274 Thus, marriage to a woman (or man) with children would not automatically trigger
responsibility for step-children unless the first husband (or wife) had abandoned the children.




heavily populated by women with children. Second, the extent to which
many men already serial parent suggests that men are not averse to tak-
ing on new responsibility. They are averse to having contact with their
ex-partners. Most divorced and separated men have children in their
lives, even if those children are not their biological issue. 276 The propo-
sal offered here would make these men's decision-making process with
regard to children a little clearer. If they are going to have children in
their lives, they must either continue their contact with an ex-spouse/
partner or incur the risk of new liability with another mother. Third, if
on the one hand people are concerned that men will not become involved
with children that are not their biological issue because those men will be
worried about future liability, and on the other hand people are con-
cerned about the extent to which men already abandon their biological
issue, we need to rethink current presumptions regarding men's entitle-
ment to parent. If, because they could avoid child support, most men
would avoid having children in their lives, it tells us something remarka-
bly disturbing about the likelihood that men will be responsible parents.
If we cannot count on men to be responsible parents, it is not clear why
we should be concerned about granting them parental rights at all.
By honoring contracts to share parental rights, the law honors the
emotional and financial bonds that develop between children and adults.
Particularly if the number of parents stays limited, there is every reason
to believe that children will benefit from a contract to share parental
rights. The financial and emotional burdens of single parenthood, though
not insurmountable, are significant.277 By finding someone with whom
to share those burdens, a mother helps ensure that a child has both the
emotional and financial support that he or she needs. Currently, the law
often assigns a second parent on the basis of biology. Empirical research
and common sense suggest that biology alone is a significantly inferior
proxy of willingness to support than is an agreement with the mother.
An agreement with the mother is volitional action or words with regard
to parenting, not action with regard to sexual behavior. It is a decision
by two adults to share parenting.278 Far more deliberation and concern is
likely to go into a decision as to whether to share one's life with a wo-
276 See DOwD, supra note 79, at 28-29.
277 After summarizing the most important research findings on single parenthood, June
Carbone writes, "[i]ntact families do better than single-parent families not because a biological
father and mother are necessarily indispensable to children's well-being, but because intact
families bring a greater array of economic, social, and emotional resources to child-rearing."
CARBONE, supra note 273, at 118.
278 Of course, not all biological parents are adults. The contract model suggests that the
law might apply special scrutiny to contracts between minors. In those cases, it is perhaps not
best to defer to the private arrangements of the parties.
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man and her child than is likely to go into a decision as to whether to
have sex.
In sum, the entitlement at issue in parenting contracts is the entitle-
ment to parental rights and responsibilities. As an initial matter, unless
she has already agreed to share part of that entitlement, the mother has an
exclusive right to that entitlement. If she has agreed to share it, the per-
son with whom she has so agreed is the other parent.. If she has not
previously agreed to share, she is the sole parent unless and until she
contracts with someone else. The terms of her contract must be limited,
however. She cannot alienate her rights completely. She must always
remain a parent and she can only contract with multiple people if a for-
mer contracting partner has abandoned the contract. 279 If a former con-
tracting partner has abandoned, 280 a new person may assume the
previous partner's status by contracting with the mother.
C. THE OBLIGATION AT ISSUE
The previous parts explained how and why the law of contract can
determine parental status. This part explains how the law of contract can
also help determine the extent of parental obligation. The contract re-
gime like the one offered here can help reorient the law's approach to
how much child support a parent owes. As discussed above, federal leg-
islation currently requires that all states establish numerical criteria and
guidelines that determine child support obligations based on a raw per-
centage of income. The extent of the noncustodial parent's previous re-
lationship with the mother and/or the child is irrelevant. This might
change, at least for some fathers, if the law took the notion of contract
more seriously.
In cases of explicit contract, the obligation owed by the father
would be determined by the explicit contract or the default rules the law
imposed on those contracts. For instance, in cases of marriage or adop-
tion, the law might demand that a person who explicitly contracts to be a
father is contracting to be a father for the entire minority of the child.
Even if the marriage only lasted two years, the father would be obligated
as father for 18 years of the child's life because of his agreement to be
the child's father.28' An agreement to marry would be a legal agreement
279 Contracting with a new partner if the former partner abandons would be akin to a right
to mitigate damages. Given the dignity and privacy concerns involved in a new contract, there
should be a right but not a duty to mitigate.
280 A mother (or father) should not be able to force an abandonment by the other parent
by refusing to let the noncustodial parent visit. The noncustodial parent has legally enforcea-
ble rights to visit until he has chosen to abandon.
281 Most states impose the child support obligation until the child's age of majority. Some
states extend the obligation beyond that if the child is pursuing an high school or college
education. See ELLMAN Er A., supra note 121, at 498-99.
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to share parenting during and after the relationship, just as an agreement
to marry is a legal agreement to share income streams during and after
the marriage. 282 These cases would look identical to what we have today
and the award could be established under the current income percentage
guideline system.
In cases of implicit contract, however, the law might make the child
support obligation proportional to the interdependence within the family.
If one discerns parental status from the behavior of the mother and fa-
ther, not from their explicit agreement, one must ask what that behavior
tells us about the duration of the obligation. Is it appropriate to discern
an 18 year commitment from a relationship that lasted two years? The
answer could be yes simply because we can impute to any potential fa-
ther the responsibility for understanding that fatherhood is permanent.
The problem with this answer is that even now when the law says that
fatherhood is permanent, a vast number of children and fathers fail to
experience it that way. Why should we expect men to understand the
inevitability of something that is demonstrably not inevitable? Why not
hold men responsible for an obligation defined by the extent of the
relationship? 283
For instance, if the family existed as a family for seven years, the
father could be obligated as a family member for another seven years. At
the end of those additional seven years his contractual obligation would
be fulfilled and he could cease payment. He would also, however, lose
his parental status. The extent of the relationship would determine the
extent of the obligation. He would be bound while separated for as long
a period of time as he was together with the family unit.284 Every year
that he demonstrates his desire to be a part of the family, enjoys the
benefits of family, and lets the other family members come to rely on
him as a member of the unit, he incurs a year of post-separation obliga-
tion. Every year that the mother lets him parent, she incurs a year of
post-separation infringement on her parental rights.285 If the noncus-
todial parent does not want to lose his parental status at the end of his
282 All states have maintenance laws which, depending on the circumstances of the mar-
riage, entitle one spouse to a share of the other spouse's income stream at least for a time. Id.
at 396-99. Maintenance obligations, like the parerting obligations discussed here, largely de-
pend on the length of the relationship and the degree of reliance. Id. at 394-95.
283 Again, the notion of letting the interdependencies developed during a relationship de-
termine the obligations after the relationship has recently been adopted by the ALl in its treat-
ment of cohabiting couples. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 172, at § 6.02. Adopting
the regime suggested here would simply expand the areas in which the law lets lived relation-
ships-that is, implicit contracts-dictate post-relationship responsibilities.
284 These numbers are just suggestions. A state could also decide to make someone
bound for twice as long as he had actually acted as a family member or for half as long.
285 Indeed, by letting him in at all, she may lose the right to ever regain exclusive parental
rights because he can exercise his option to be a permanent parent.
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required obligation (seven years in the above example), he should be
allowed to maintain his parental status by maintaining his obligation.
That is, he can opt into permanent parental status. A person who has
acted as a parent for the full length of the contract and whom the mother
has accepted as a parent should be able to maintain that status perma-
nently. 286 Thus, the ability to terminate the relationship at the contract's
end would be vested solely in the noncustodial parent, likely the father.
This would minimize the chances that children would have to suffer the
loss of a parent.
At a theoretical level, this regime differs substantially from the re-
gime we have now, but in practice, the number of payments might well
be similar. The separated father who meets his obligation for the full
contract term is likely to be concerned and involved enough with his
children's lives to maintain his support. If he wants to maintain his
rights to see his children, he will have to maintain his support.287 He will
stay father for eighteen years.
Many fathers who are supposed to stay fathers for eighteen years
under the current regime do not, however. They abandon two to three
years after separation. A regime that explicitly limited their obligation
would not make much difference. At the margin, in some cases, one
might see a difference. For instance, under the proposed regime, a man
who is only obligated for three years might only pay for three years,
whereas under the current regime, although he is obligated for fifteen
years, he only pays for five years. It is possible, but highly speculative;
that fathers that pay are likely to visit and if they visit they are not likely
to want to relinquish their parental status.
As it is now, there is a hesitancy to hold non-biologically related
men who have clearly been a part of a family unit to the obligations they
have incurred as part of the unit precisely because their behavior does not
seem to warrant holding them responsible for the child's full minority;
the current law does not have a way of holding them responsible for
somethingless than everything. The rigidity of the system now, both in
terms of who is responsible for paying and what must be paid may help
make court awards uniform, but there is no place in the current system
for multiple or serial fathers. This means that men who gain the benefits
of parenthood are often left free to ignore the burdens of parenthood, and
286 That permanent status could be terminated by the state only upon a finding of abuse or
neglect.




some men who have never enjoyed the benefits of parenthood because
they never wanted it, are nonetheless required to pay.
288
Using the construct of contract doctrine further, courts could deter-
mine child support with reference to the damages suggested by the con-
tract. Whether one labels these damages reasonable reliance or
expectation damages, the calculation would likely be the same. Parents
rely on other parents by incurring debt, forgoing jobs, and forgoing other
relationships that might bring in more money. The longer a family unit
lasts, the greater the reliance, the more reasonable the expectation that
the support will continue, and the higher the number of lost opportunities
to contract with someone else. The child support award should reflect
these costs. 289
This is not to say that child support awards should be the reliance or
expectation measure per se. To make it such would assume that the non-
custodial parent was necessarily the breaching party. Not only would
this run the risk of reintroducing problematic fault determinations into
family law, 290 it would necessarily make the financial cost of break-up
for the noncustodial parent greater than the cost of break-up on the custo-
dial parent. The custodial parent would not have to bear any of the costs
associated with losing the economies of scale that accompany shared liv-
ing space. Although it might be nice to spare the child the cost of those
lost economies, such an approach is not realistic and unfair to noncus-
todial parents who may not have done anything wrong. Instead, reliance
and expectation measures should be used as a ceiling from which to de-
termine child support awards. From that ceiling, judges can determine
an appropriate child award measure, taking into account the costs that
288 The ALI's custody and visitation provisions foresee multiple adults having visitation
privileges, but they do not envision many multiple or serial sources of child support. Compare
AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, supra note 172, at § 2.03 with §§ 3.01-3.04.
289 It is important to remember, though, that a decision to discontinue employment or
education or to forego a more lucrative job because of the support someone else is providing is
only reasonable if there are sound reasons to presume that the source of support will continue.
An explicit promise to provide support would provide reasonable assurance of long term sup-
port as would a long-term relationship. In those cases, the dependent parent might be entitled
to something like reliance damages. Relying on a short term relationship (for instance, one
year) to provide long term support would not be reasonable. The damages in a short term
relationship should be more limited precisely because it would be unreasonable to assume that
a short term commitment is a long term commitment.
290 Although some have argued that the advent of no-fault divorce hurt women finan-
cially, see LENORE J. WErrMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLurION (1985), there has not been a huge
cry from feminists or others for the re-establishment of fault determinations. Few people seem
to relish the idea of a third party judge with no previous knowledge of the parties deciding who
was more at fault in a relationship. Moreover, from a feminist perspective, a fault regime
might hurt women even more than they are currently hurt by divorce law. See id. Women
institute divorce proceedings more often then men do. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W.
Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking ": Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 Am. L.
& EcON. REv. 126, 126-27 (2000).
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will be associated with the noncustodial parent having to establish a
home for himself.291
Admittedly, child support awards under such a system would be
harder to determine and more variable than they are now. Some readers
may legitimately question whether contract law is up to the task of deter-
mining what the award should be. Figuring out the primary caretaker's
reliance or expectation interest will be very difficult. Indeed, it is a diffi-
culty with which family law was historically familiar. Before the federal
legislation requiring uniform percentage grid systems for determining
child support, 292 family court judges around the country had very little
guidance on what standards should be used to determine child support.
Several studies concluded that this led to a wildly erratic system, both
because of too few awards of child support being ordered and because of
too much variability in the awards that were made.293 The percentage
grid system brought a great deal of wanted consistency to child support
awards. 29
4
The grid system is popular and works well in many contexts, but it
seems ill-suited to deal with situations in which notions of fatherhood (or
parenthood) are contested. It is one thing to say that someone who eve-
ryone agrees is and should be treated as a father as traditionally under-
stood must pay 20% or 25% of his income in child support regardless of
how well that percentage figure actually reflects the caretaker's reliance
or need. It is another thing to say that someone who never intended to be
or acted as father should be so responsible, and it is still another thing to
say that someone who never explicitly accepted the responsibilities of
fatherhood but nonetheless let others reasonably rely on him as a father
for a period of years should be responsible for paying 20% of his income
in child support for the full period of a child's minority. This latter man
is a father of sorts, but should he be a father forever?
If one answers yes to that question and is comfortable holding tem-
porary or implicit fathers responsible for supporting a child for the full
term of the child's minority, then one can simply use the grid. The grid
system could apply to anyone who is a father and one need not look to
contract doctrine to help craft an award. In such a regime, we would use
contract law only to determine who the father is, not what he owes. At
the other extreme, if one thinks the contract regime should be completely
291 What should not be subtracted from the reliance ceiling are the costs a noncustodial
parent may incur with new children. The parties may be asked to share, to some extent, the
inevitable cost of a break-up, but the custodial parent should not be asked to bear the burdens
of future relationships from which she gets no benefit.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
293 See Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Ade-
quacy, Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 326-27 (1991).
294 Id. at 344-45.
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adopted, then we should abandon the grid system altogether and let the
wording and/or nature of the adult contract always determine the extent
of the parental obligation. This article endorses a middle course, one that
uses the popular uniform grid system in cases where there is ready con-
sensus on who the father is and on the scope of his obligation, 295 but one
that endorses more of a reliance based system in cases where paternal
status is more tenuous and the scope of the obligation more ambiguous.
Thus, under the system proposed here, most of the men held respon-
sible now and any man who willingly opted into the status of permanent
father could still be bound by the current guidelines. Remember though,
that many of the men who would be held responsible under a contract
regime currently have no liability under the guidelines because they are
not the biological fathers of the child. The contract-based support
amount would most likely apply to unmarried biological fathers who cur-
rently pay sporadically and incompletely and to non-biological fathers
who rarely pay anything at all.
As it is now, the determining factor in whether a non-biological
father owes anything is often whether the biological father can be found.
This is an arbitrary system that makes a non-biological father's obliga-
tion a function of what someone else does, and a biological father's obli-
gation a function of his sexual conduct, not his parenting conduct. The
regime offered here would eliminate that arbitrariness. Parents who have
parented would be obligated as parents. This regime would be harder to
administer because it is nuanced, but it is nuanced in a way that reflects
the reality of contemporary parenting. A more flexible, albeit potentially
more variable, system stands a better chance of making men who cur-
rently act as fathers, responsible as fathers.
D. EXAMPLES
Some examples may help bring the various strands of this proposal
together.
1. The Easy Cases
Frank, a New York City police officer made famous in print and on
film for his willingness to expose corruption in the Police Department,
slept with a woman named Pamela, who told him she was using birth
control when she knew that she was not.296 Pamela got pregnant and
sued Frank for child support. In 1983, New York's highest court found
Frank liable for child support in an amount proportional to what he
295 This would probably be the case in marriage situations or situations in which there
was an explicit promise to accept the responsibilities of fatherhood.
296 See In re Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 714 (N.Y. 1983); CARBONE, supra
note 273, at 154.
2004]
58 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
earned. 297 Under the proposed regime, Frank would not be liable for
child support, nor would he have any rights as a father. The rights and
responsibilities for any child born of the sexual liaison would be vested
in Pamela alone unless and until she found someone else willing to as-
sume the role of father.
Tamara Budnick and Frederick Silverman signed an agreement in
which they agreed that Frederick would not assume any responsibility for
a child bom of their sexual liaison.298 In 2002, a Florida court found
Silverman responsible for child support notwithstanding the contract.
Under the proposed regime, he would not be responsible because the
contract clearly indicates his intent not to parent.
Ann and Dudley Nygard met in July of 1982.299 In October of
1982, Ann discovered that she was 5 months pregnant. Dudley asked
Ann to stay with him, notwithstanding both of their knowledge that the
pregnancy could not have resulted from their sexual activity. He also
agreed "to raise the child as his own."'300 Ann and Dudley married in
December of 1982 and separated in May of 1984.301 A Michigan court
ordered Dudley to pay child support, finding either that the oral contract
was enforceable, or, if the statute of frauds barred enforcement of the
contract, that Dudley was bound under doctrines of equitable or promis-
sory estoppel. 30 2 Under the current regime, the case would come out
precisely the same way, either because of Dudley's explicit promise to
act as father or because by marrying Ann he agreed to be a father to any
children born of the marriage. 30 3
Stephen and Robin Markov were married in 1986.30 4 Ten months
later, Robin gave birth to twins.30 5 After a rocky marriage, the parties
permanently separated in March of 1997.306 The parties agreed that by
1992, both realized that the twins were not Stephen's biological issue.30 7
Nonetheless, Stephen continued to see the twins and make child support
payments until May of 1998. At that time, Stephen denied responsibility
for supporting the twins based on his lack of biological connection. 30 8
Maryland's highest court found that Stephen could be held responsible
297 See In re Pamela P., 449 N.E.2d at 715. For the story of Frank Serpico's career, see
PETER MASS, SERPICO (1973).
298 See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
299 See Nygard v. Nygard, 401 N.W.2d 323, 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
300 See id. at 325.
301 Id.
302 See id. at 327.
303 The marital contract has never been subject to the statute of frauds.




308 Id. at 78.
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for child support, notwithstanding the lack of genetic connection, but
only upon Robin presenting sufficient evidence that the biological father
could not be found.309 Under the proposed regime, the presence of the
biological father would be irrelevant. Stephen would be held responsible
as father and would have rights as father because he agreed to raise chil-
dren born to the marriage.3 10
2. The Harder Cases
Amy and Tom dated fairly regularly but were not married. Amy got
pregnant. Tom supported her emotionally and with some financial assis-
tance throughout the pregnancy. He was present at the birth of the child
(Lisa) and stayed as a regular presence in Amy and Lisa's life until Lisa
was three years old. He contributed to Amy's household, paying for
food, clothes, and other expenses for Lisa. By the time Lisa was three,
Tom began to drift away. He was around much less and contributed
almost nothing. By the time Lisa was four, Amy no longer knew where
he was.
At this point, Amy could sue for paternity. The suit would be based
on an implicit promise to support and not based on Tom's blood relation-
ship to Lisa. The facts of this paternity case would look remarkably sim-
ilar to the average facts alleged in paternity suits now. As mentioned,
most fathers sued in paternity were present for the birth of the child and
remained in a relationship with the mother for two to three years after the
child's birth.311 What would likely be different is the extent of Tom's
obligation. Tom would be liable for an amount of support that reflected
Ann's reasonable reliance on his contributions. For instance, he could be
liable for three years of subsequent support. During those three years he
would have full parental rights. If he paid for those three years-and at
any time prior to the end of those three years-he wouldhave the right to
opt into permanent parental status. If he did so, the amount of his obliga-
tion would be determined by standard child support guidelines.
If Amy did not sue Tom for paternity, it is very likely that another
man (call him Bill) would enter Amy and Lisa's life and assume a par-
ent-like role.312 As Bill provided continuing emotional and financial
support to Amy and Lisa's household, he would make himself potentially
309 See id. at 83-84.
310 If the parties wanted to contract out of the marital presumption ex ante, there would be
no reason not to let them. Thus, parties could design a marital presumption that applied only
in cases in which the children were biologically related. For policy reasons, though, the state
should probably require that such a contract include a provision requiring genetic testing at
birth so that the parties would know all relevant biological facts as soon as possible.
311 See supra Section II.D.
312 See generally, DOWD, supra note 79, at 29-30 (providing that serial parenting is
common).
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responsible and potentially protected as a father. Whether Bill became
legally responsible would depend on whether Tom had drifted away. If
Tom was an obvious presence in Lisa's life, then there could be no rea-
sonable reliance on Bill as father. However, if Tom ceased acting as
father, he would be deemed to have abandoned his paternal relationship,
and Bill could assume that role either explicitly or implicitly. Again, the
facts of this situation are common.313 If Amy and Bill explicitly agreed
that Bill should assume parental status, the situation would be function-
ally identical to the hundreds of stepparent adoptions that currently hap-
pen every year in this country. 314 Bill would be the equivalent of a
stepparent adopter and Tom's right would be terminated during that
adoption proceeding. 315 The outcome would be different if Amy and
Bill did not explicitly agree that Bill would assume parental status.
Under the proposed model, a court should be free to infer such an agree-
ment in the absence of explicit words or contract. Once that agreement
can be inferred from the parties' behavior, Bill can sue Amy to maintain
contact with Lisa if Amy tries to bar him from such, and Ann can sue
Bill for support if Bill drifts away like Tom.
3. The Modem Cases
Dick and Fred are a gay couple that wants to have a child. Dick
enters into a surrogacy arrangement with Beth. Either using an ovum
purchased from someone else or Beth's ovum, Beth is impregnated with
Dick's sperm. Pursuant to the surrogacy contract, Beth relinquishes all
her parental rights at birth. If Dick has not previously signed a parenting
agreement with Fred, Dick is the sole parent. If Dick and Fred have
signed a parenting agreement, Dick and Fred are the co-parents to the
child born as a result of the surrogacy agreement.
Laura is a single woman. She wants to be a mother. She convinces
her friend Gary to have intercourse with her in the hope that she will get
pregnant. Laura and Gary never discuss Gary's future role as a father.
Laura gets pregnant and gives birth to Billy. During the pregnancy and
after birth Laura and Gary maintain their friendship. Gary sees Billy
from time to time, often bringing him gifts. The relationship between
Laura and Gary cannot be considered interdependent. They do not live
together; they do not provide for each other economically; they do not
make mutual decisions about Billy's well-being; Laura does not rely on
313 See id.
314 See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 1398-99. To be a stepparent adoption, Ann
and Bill would have to marry first, but the point is that the growing trend if for courts to be
particularly willing to let a "new parent" become "the other parent" if the first parent has not
met the responsibilities of parenthood. See id.
315 See In re J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986) (holding the biological father's parental
rights terminated when stepfather adopted child).
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Gary for care or support of Billy. Laura cannot sue Gary for child sup-
port and Gary cannot sue Laura for parental rights.31 6 If Laura chooses
to, she can marry or otherwise contract with another man or woman. It
would be by virtue of that subsequent contract that Billy would acquire a
second parent.
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Using contract doctrine as a construct through which to interpret
parental status offers a more coherent paradigm than does the current
system. It also does a better job of incorporating contemporary mores
and contemporary technology. In addition, it has positive policy implica-
tions. It also has some negative policy implications. This section looks
at the policy advantages and disadvantages of a parental status regime
based on contract.
A. ADVANTAGES
The proposed model embraces two major distinctions that contem-
porary family law ignores: first, the distinction between mothers and fa-
thers (or primary caretakers and secondary caretakers), 317 and second,
distinctions between fathers. In doing so, the proposed model eliminates
two distinctions that currently have great salience in the law of
parenthood-the distinction between "technologically produced" and
"regularly produced" children, and the distinction between straight par-
ents and gay parents.31 8 The proposed model eliminates the current dis-
tinction between technologically produced children and others by
adopting the model that we currently use for determining the parenthood
of technologically produced children-namely, contract. Under the pro-
posed regime, as under the contemporary law of reproductive technolo-
gies, preconception intent, as manifested in an agreement with the
316 Compare Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
sperm donor friend who visited with child and remained friendly with mother was child's legal
father because there was no evidence that the parties did not intend him to be the child's
father). Under the proposed regime, the burden would be on the person trying to establish
parenthood to prove intent, not on the person denying parenthood to prove lack of intent.
317 It is important to emphasize here that not all family structures will have primary and
secondary caretakers. If two adults who had truly shared both caretaking and support obliga-
tions were to split up, it would be clear that both adults had parental status and that both adults
shared parental obligation. The contract would dictate that each party continue sharing both
the rights and obligations as they had been doing. See text accompanying note 329.
318 Arguably, the proposed model replaces distinctions made possible by modem society
with distinctions that had more relevance historically. Technologically-produced children and
same-gender parents are new phenomena that have salience. Though tender years presump-
tions, alimony laws, and legitimacy doctrine used to make distinctions between mothers and
fathers and between fathers, those doctrines have decreased in importance recently. I am argu-
ing that these much older distinctions are actually more relevant than the modem ones, though
for very different reasons than those that historically justified them.
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gestational mother, would be the critical factor in determining
parenthood at birth. Post-conception intent, as manifested, implicitly or
explicitly, in an agreement with the primary caretaker, would be the criti-
cal factor in determining parental rights and obligations as the child
grows. The proposed model eliminates the distinction between gay and
straight parents also because it acknowledges that one gains parental sta-
tus not by a biological connection to the child but by contributing to and
situating oneself in the interdependence of a family structure that in-
cludes children. Whereas courts now often struggle to determine the sta-
tus of the non-biological gay parent/partner, under the proposed regime it
would be clear. That person, man or woman, is the "father," and she or
he is the father by virtue of an agreement with the mother.
At this point, readers concerned about sex equality are probably
bristling at the labels of mother and father. How can we achieve sex
equality, much less degender caretaking, 319 if we structure the law of
parenthood around the very sex differences that we are trying to elimi-
nate? As mentioned in the introduction, this article uses the term mother
in its biological and social sense, but not necessarily in the sense that it
means "female parent." Comparably, it uses the term father to mean
"partner of mother" and not necessarily "male parent." I do this, follow-
ing Martha Fineman's lead,320 to ensure that what has legal meaning and
value is precisely the biological and cultural contributions that mothers
have traditionally made. What need not be salient is the sex of the per-
son parenting. If a man is mothering a child because the female parent
has abandoned the child, or for any other reason, then the law should
treat that man as a mother. If a woman is fathering a child by supporting
the family structure economically while someone else is doing more of
the caretaking, then the law should treat that woman as a father. If both
parents are doing identical jobs, then the labels are irrelevant anyway.
For the most part, the law needs to be concerned with the rights and
obligations of parenthood only when a family unit breaks up and the
parties look to the law to determine relative responsibilities. The labels
of mother and father are remarkably unimportant at that stage because
the contract analogy proposed suggests that the rights and obligations
should be based on the established pattern of behavior of the family as it
existed when it was intact. Which sex holds which role is irrelevant.
The rights and obligations follow the established role, not gender.
319 On the importance of degendering caretaking-that is, spreading the costs of caring
for others from women to men-see Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1495, 1520-24 (1997).
320 See FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 234-35. ("I have deliberately (even defiantly) chosen
not to make my alternative vision gender neutral by substituting terms such as 'caretaker' ...




Of course, the one place where sex is salient is at birth. Men cannot
mother a child in utero. For those primarily concerned with degendering
all notions of parenthood, a regime that not only acknowledges but re-
wards women's gestational labor may seem problematic. On the other
hand, for many, much of the law's current refusal to acknowledge or
reward women's gestational labor seems extraordinarily unjust. As dis-
cussed, men simply cannot invest what women must invest in pregnancy,
and what women must invest is huge. Rewarding that investment with
superior rights simply reflects a principle basic to the common law
321
and to more recent trends in family law rewarding investment with
rights. 322 Refusing to honor what is unquestionably a greater contribu-
tion smacks more of oppression than equality. 323 Thus, the reward that
the proposed model offers to gestational mothers is not offered as a re-
treat from ideals of gender equality, but as an embrace of those ideals.
Only if we recognize and reward the labor that women have always done
and, to a large extent, continue to do, can we expect a world of meaning-
ful equality.
The distinction between mothers and fathers proposed here builds
on Martha Fineman's suggestion to restructure the family relationship
around the caretaking-based parent-child dyad instead of the sexually-
based husband-wife dyad.324 By making the gestational mother-child re-
lationship primary, the proposed model gives significant parenting power
to women. It also, like Fineman's model, helps unmask dependencies
that the sexual family model hides. Fineman, more than any other femi-
nist or family scholar, has made us all realize how much dependencies
beget dependencies. By taking care of dependents, caretakers become
dependent because the person in need of care demands the time, re-
sources, and energy that the caretaker would otherwise use to take care
of herself.325 The proposed model recognizes that women often try to
meet these dependencies by entering into relationships with others. It
recognizes that in meeting those dependencies men must not be viewed
simply as generous philanthropists, but as individuals willingly undertak-
321 David Ellerman suggests that labor desert theory-or rewarding those who have in-
vested more-is the principal normative theory of property law. David P. Ellerman, On the
Labor Theory of Property, 16 Phil. F. 293, 302-04 (1985). Some may argue that property
theories should not apply to children, but virtually all scholarly and practical proposals for
custody determinations suggest that relative emotional investment in the child should be a
determinative factor. See Baker, supra note 245, at 1581.
322 As discussed, supra text accompanying notes 231, the ALl suggests that custody and
parental rights should be awarded based on the established patterns within the family unit.
Established patterns serve as proxies for relative investment.
323 For more on the difference in male and female contribution, see Katharine K. Baker,
Biology for Feminists, 75 Cni.-KEr L. REV. 805, 822-23 (2000).
324 See FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 226-36.
325 See FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 103.
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ing obligations in return for benefits. It forces men to take their family
obligations seriously because it holds them responsible only for those
obligations that they have willfully accepted.
Where this proposal differs from Fineman's is in its ability to incor-
porate fathers and reward them when they deserve it. As I have argued
elsewhere, a world in which women have all the parental power and all
the parental responsibility is not necessarily a feminist ideal. 326 The evi-
dence suggests that the vast majority of mothers want to share the rights
and responsibilities of parenthood with someone else.327 Women want
someone with whom to share the physical, financial, and emotional bur-
dens and they want someone with whom to share the joy. For many
parents, it is simply more fun to parent together than apart. To make it
worthwhile for men to share in the hardships and the fun, the law must
be prepared to honor the sacrifices they make in parenting and the desires
they demonstrate to parent.
By honoring those sacrifices and desires, the proposed model draws
men into the family unit, but in a much more rational and just fashion
than does contemporary paternity law. Instead of relying on confused
and inconsistent invocations of punishment and deterrence, the proposed
model links parental status to a willful acceptance of parental responsi-
bility. Instead of assuming that genetic contribution gives rise to moral
responsibility, the proposed model assumes that parental participation
gives rise to moral responsibility. Instead of assuming, without explana-
tion, that the child's entitlement must be tied to the parent's income, the
proposed model links the child's entitlement to what the child and his or
her primary caretaker have bargained for and come to rely on. It also
links parental obligation to parental rights in a way that can explain why
someone must continue to pay support even if he is not acting as a par-
ent. He must continue to pay because he agreed to pay. By rooting pa-
rental status in contract, the proposed model provides a unified
understanding of where parental rights and obligations come from, while
still recognizing that different contracts will require different remedies.
It makes distinctions between different kinds of fathers to make sense of
legal fatherhood.
As should be clear, also, by dispensing with biology as the nominal
sine qua non of fatherhood, we are not likely to be dispensing with the
bi-parenting norm that paternity doctrine currently reifies. The great ma-
jority of children will have at least two parents because most mothers
share parental status at some point during a child's life. 328 Moreover, the
two parents they have will be individuals who chose parenthood, not
326 See Baker, supra note 319, at 1514-19.
327 Id. at 1519.
328 Down, supra note 79, at 205 ("Parenting is rarely done is isolation.").
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individuals on whom the law imposed parental status. Some children
may have mothers who chose not to parent with somebody else. Other
children may have fathers who abandon them after a time. The children
in either of these categories would, of course, find plenty of similarly
situated friends among the children in our current regime. Today, the
children of women who are not married and have not previously agreed
to share parental rights when they choose to buy sperm, have no fathers.
Comparably, children of women who are not married and have not previ-
ously agreed to share parental rights when they have sex often raise the
child without a father and refuse to pursue the biological father in pater-
nity. Other single women who want to parent and are tired of or uninter-
ested in waiting for marriage simply choose to adopt.329 There is little
reason to believe the proposed model will increase the number of chil-
dren in these categories. 330 As many children with fathers today will
likely have fathers under the new regime, but they will have fathers who
willingly assumed the role.331
I consider the foregoing to be advantages of the proposed regime.
Eliminating distinctions that needlessly exclude deserving people from
parental status, while at the same time recognizing that varying kinds of
investment and commitment should give rise to proportional rights and
obligations, are positive developments for the law of parenthood. How-
ever, the proposed regime also brings disadvantages, including, most no-
tably, the problem of cost.
B. DISADVANTAGES
The current system ensures that, except for children bom to single
women by virtue of artificial insemination, there are always two poten-
tial sources of financial support for a child and it mandates that each
potential source pay a given percentage of his or her income. Thus, the
current system helps eschew state responsibility for children. More sin-
gle mothers may be in need of financial help in the proposed regime
because they will not be able to pursue the biological father of the child
for the full percentage of his income that the current regime makes him
responsible for paying to her. This could be a considerable disadvantage.
329 See Bonnie Miller Rubin, Adoption Brings Kids into Singles' Lives, CHI. TRIB., May
11, 2003, at C 1.
330 There is some possibility that women will not pursue the father in the new regime
because they will receive enough money from the state to support the child without the man's
contribution. This is possibly true, but again, speculative. The fact is that women will always
have an incentive to try to bargain with a man because she stands to gain more support from
the bargain.
331 Some children today have legal fathers whom the state, though not the mother, has
chosen to pursue. To my knowledge, there is no indication that these state-pursued fathers are
fathers in anything like a nurturing or cultural sense.
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It also might not make much difference. Most of the child support
that gets paid, is paid voluntarily. 332 Almost half of unwed women who
could pursue the biological father for paternity choose not to do so. 333
Those that do make paternity claims can usually base the claim on rela-
tionship as well as blood. 334 Moreover, regardless of the theory of their
claims, most unwed mothers have precious little to gain, even if their
claims are successful. The average unwed father earns just over $16,000
a year. 335 Money spent on enforcement might be more efficiently spent
on a direct subsidy to children. Also, of course, in the proposed regime,
there would be more money coming from a source that is now only
tapped sporadically-non-biological fathers who have acted as fathers.
Thus, it is actually quite hard to estimate how much more a contract
regime would cost.
Even if the proposed system did require greater governmental ex-
penditure on children, budgeting for those resources would do nothing
more than bring the United States up to par with the rest of the industrial-
ized world. The current scheme in this country, which assumes bilateral
obligation stemming from blood and assumes that two parents acting
alone should be able to meet all of the needs of children, is followed
virtually nowhere else in the world. As mentioned earlier, with the ex-
ceptions of China and the United States, every industrialized country has
a family allowance program that provides regular cash payments to fami-
lies with children regardless of need. 336 Some of these programs are
332 See Harris, supra note 210, at 476.
333 See supra notes 193-96.
334 See supra Section lI.D.
335 Lauren M. Rich, Regular and Irregular Earnings of Unwed Fathers: Implications for
Child Support Practices? 10 (Bendheim-Thoman Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing,
Working Paper No. 99-10-FF, July 1999), available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpa-
pers/WP99-10-FF-Rich.pdf. Rich notes that if one includes underground employment in the
fathers' earnings, the average goes up 5%, but there is no guarantee that underground earnings
could be traced and captured by authorities looking for child support. See id. at 10-11. In
addition, statistics tracking child support enforcement over the last decade show an increase in
the percentage of child support cases with collections, but a decrease in the amount collected
per case. Vicki Turetsky, Child Support Trends 7 (Center for Law and Public Policy, Wash-
ington, D.C., May 2003), available at http://www.clasp.org/Pubs/DMS/Documents/10549163
34. l/cstrends_0503.pdf.
336 See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at xxv-xxvi, xxx-xxxv. China
and most non-industrialized nations depend far more heavily on extended family extended
family networks for both financial support and parental figures. See generally, ANDREA B.
RUGH, FAMILY IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPr 201 (1984) (finding families are under social pres-
sure to help their less fortunate relatives, such as the elderly who are rarely institutionalized
unless no family caretakers remain); C.K. YANG, THE CHINESE FAMILY IN THE COMMUNIST
REVOLUTION 150 (1959) (finding that in traditional Chinese families, grand and great-grand
parents are often responsible for child care); Maria G. Cattell, The Discourse of Neglect: Fam-
ily Support for the Elderly in Samia, in AFRICAN FAMILIES AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
157, 157 (Thomas S. Weisner et al. eds., 1997) (finding in sub-Saharan Africa, extended fami-
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employer based; others are run completely by the government. 337 Many
of these countries also supplement the basic family allowance amount in
single-parent households. 338 In other words, most of the industrialized
world does not consider the dependency of youth a matter of private
concem. 339 If the United States could sever its allegiance to privatizing
the dependency of youth, the proposed contractual framework would ap-
pear both less radical and less costly. The fact is that there are young
dependents, just as there are old dependents, who need our collective
help because taking care of them is more than any one person can man-
age on his or her own. Collective responsibility for children should fol-
low from the fact that children, like the elderly, are needy, and not from
the fact that they are fatherless.
There are many ways that the polity could meet this collective re-
sponsibility. First, of course, any extra money needed in light of an al-
tered system of parental status could come from general revenue.
Rhetorically, it is very easy for politicians to talk about supporting chil-
dren. The proposed regime would give them a reason and a way to im-
plement that support. Alternatively, some sort of payroll tax, not unlike
the current FICA system, could amply supply a family allowance pro-
gram designed to give dependency assistance. Much greater per child
tax deductions, coupled with a program that adequately provided for
children whose parents were earning too little to take advantage of tax
deductions, could also achieve the desired goals.
Moreover, as suggested earlier, if we are deeply concerned about
the moral obligation or deterrent functions that a biologically-based pa-
ternity system may serve, a tax on biological fathers could serve those
functions just as well while providing additional income for children.
Again looking at the United States' peer countries, most biological fa-
thers pay something towards support of their children, but what they pay
is a fraction of the subsidy that caretakers receive. The government as-
sumes the primary responsibility for providing a minimum standard of
support. 340 Moreover, these biological fathers usually have limited, if
lies continue to be the primary support system for society's vulnerable members, including
children and the elderly).
337 See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4.
338 Austria, Denmark, England, Israel, Netherlands, Sweden, and F.R. Germany all have
special support for one parent families. See Kahn & Kamerman supra note 6, at 45. France
also has a special allowance for single parents. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra
note 4.
339 The non-industrialized world is less likely to have state support, but also much more
likely to have extended family support. The non-industrialized world does not assume that
two parents acting alone can raise a child.
340 See Kahn & Kamerman, supra note 6, at 45-49.
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any, parental rights.34' What this means is that men have less of a need
to avoid detection (because they will not be responsible for that much
support) and mothers have less need to hide the biological father's iden-
tity (because he cannot meaningfully interfere with her parental rights).
These differences may well account for the vastly different rates of pater-
nity establishment in the United States and its peer countries. In most of
the United States' peer countries, the paternity establishment rate for
children of unmarried mothers hovers around 90%.342 In the United
States, it is 30%.343 Thus, perhaps ironically, making biological father-
hood significantly less important legally may make it easier to find and
secure money from biological fathers.
A tax on biological fathers would not provide all of the funding
needed, but it could help defray the cost. It would also not make men
fathers in either the financial or the social sense because fatherhood
would come from relationship, not blood. Men would have status as
fathers not because women and children need support, but because the
men have meaningfully participated as family members.
CONCLUSION
There is a great deal of discussion these days about both genetics
and fatherhood. On what seems like a daily basis, the biological sciences
make new discoveries about the relevance of biology in our lives.344
Comparably, the debate within the social sciences about the importance
of fathers in children's lives rages on.345 There can be little doubt that
341 See generally, W. Craig Williams, The Paradox of Paternity Establishment: As Rights
Go Up, Rates Go Down, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 261 (1997) (comparing the relative
paternal rights and paternity establishment rates in the United States, Denmark, the Nether-
lands, and Germany).
342 See Kahn & Kamerman, supra note 6, at 368. In Sweden, a country with particularly
generous family support allowances, it is 95%. Id.
343 DOWD, supra note 79, at 6.
344 See generally, Karen Augd, Genetics Poised to Drive Medicine; DNA Profiles May
Transform Health Care into Prevention, DENVER POST, May 13, 2003, at IA (discussing how
advances in preventative and personalized medicine can increase the success of treatments by
helping doctors predict inherited responses to drugs based on patient's genetic makeup); Bene-
dict Carey, DNA Research Links Depression to Family Ties, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2003, at F3
(announcing breakthroughs in the determination of genes linked to inherited susceptibility to
depression); Marilynn Marchione, Gene Analysis Better At Spotting Cancer Risk: DNA Chip
Can Help Determine Treatment for Breast Tumors, Doctors Say, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, at
1A (discussing how the structure of a woman's DNA, analyzed with the aid of microchips, can
assist doctors in determining how successfully a woman will respond to chemotherapy for
breast cancer); Tim Radford, 'Genetic Shield' May Beat Cancer; DNA Offers Hope of Altering
Path of Evolution, GUARDIAN (London), April 24, 2003, at 9 (discussing potential of genetic
therapy that could interrupt further inheritance of cancer gene).
345 Compare generally WILLIAM GALSTON, A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Par-
ent Family, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 14 (1990-91) (arguing for more rigid norms of fa-
ther presence) and DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA (1995) (arguing that fathers
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both genes and fathers (or, more precisely, two parent families) matter,
but there are loads of reasons to doubt that a genetic father matters.
This article has shown that the law has always been willing and at
times eager to dismiss the importance of the genetic connection. It has
dismissed the importance of that connection most often when there is a
different relevant connection-between the mother and another man-in
the child's life. It is increasingly dismissing the importance of genetic
connection when genetics are separated from sexual activity. The ad-
vances in technology that allow us to learn more about the role of genet-
ics in our lives also make it possible to distill genetics from gestation,
sexual activity, and intent to be a parent. The more these previously
inseparable factors can be isolated, the more the law must come to terms
with how important each factor is to determining parental status. Intent
to parent is emerging as the primary determinant of parental status. Re-
laxed social norms with regard to sexual behavior and parenting patterns
are also forcing courts to confront equitable claims to parenthood when
there is indisputably no genetic connection. Courts' receptivity to these
claims turns largely on the extent to which the mother and father figure
seem to have manifested a mutual intent to parent.
This trend away from genetics and towards contract is a positive
development. It is a development that reconciles paternity precedent
with technological advances, legal norms with parenting practices, and
sexual mores with parental obligations. It is a development that makes
every parent-child relationship a wanted parent-child relationship. The
science of genetics increasingly tells us who we are. It need not tell us
who our parents are.
are essential to a child's healthy upbringing); with THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVEL-
OPMENT (Michael E. Lamb ed., 3d ed. 1997) (arguing that what is important to children is the
resources that second parents can bring to the child and his or her primary caretaker, not the
second parent per se) and FINEMAN, supra note 2 (endorsing a regime in which fathers have no
official role to play in the family).
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